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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines American shipyard productivity. An attempt is made to measure
changes in U.S. shipbuilding productivity to ascertain if U.S. yards are improving their
position relative to their competitors. An international comparison of wages, material
and overhead prices and cost structures are used to assess America's current competitive
position. This study also provides a qualitative survey of'lesser known shipbuilding na-
tions about which little quantitative data has been published. A discussion of obstacles,
such as government policy deficiencies and business practices, which continue to inhibit
commercial shipbuilding productivity in the United States is also included. Recommen-
dations are also provided.
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For 150 years, the United States conmercial shipbuilding industry was regarded as
a world leader in innovation, quality, and productivity. Following World War II. how-
ever, the industry entered a long decline. Beginning in the 1970's, the productivity o,'
U.S. commercial shipyards was reputed to be only half that of Scandinavian and
Japanese shipyards.
During the 1980's, U.S. shipbuilders focused their attention almost exclusively on
the construction of a 600 ship Na.y to counter their cold war adversary, the Soviet
Union. This decade also witnessed Japan's continued domination of xorid conmmerciai
shipbuilding and Korea's emergence as an ever more powerful shipbuilding entity. Other
nations honed their shipbuilding prowess and became increasingly fierce competitors in
a global commercial market.
The world has changed dramatically as the decade of the 1990's unfolds. For U.S.
shipbuilders the focus is shifting away from naval shipbuilding and the cold war and
t,., 'ard industrial competitiveness in commercial markets.
It is against this backdrop, that the issue of U.S. commercial shipbuilding produc-
tivity is revisited.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This thesis will attempt to answer several questions about the U.S. commercial
shipbuilding industry. These include:
I. Where do U.S. commercial shipbuilders stand with respect to their international
competitors?
2. las U.S. commercial shipbuilding productivity improved during the past decade?
3. What obstacles exist to future productivity gains for U.S. commercial shipbuilders?
4. What actions can be taken to overcome these obstacles?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This thesis will examine American shipy-rd productivity. An attempt will be made
to measure changes in U.S. shipbuilding productivity to ascertain if U.S. yards are im-
proving their position relative to their competitors. An international comparison of
wages, material and overhead prices and cost structures will be used to assess America's
current competitive position. This study will also provide a qualitative survey of lesser
known shipbuilding nations about which little quantitative data has been published. A
discussion of obstacles in the form of government policy deficiencies and business prac-
tices which continue to inhibit commercial shipbuilding productivity will also be in-
cluded. Recommendations for improving the competitiveness of the industry will also
be examined.
Library research and a comprehensive review of international shipbuilding literature
provided the vast majority of the information contained in this study. Data provided
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) will be used to make comparisons about inter-
national wages. International trade publications will be used to estimate material prices.
Various shipbuilding publications produced by Lloyd and Fairplay will be also used to
obtain data on shipbuilding prices and shipbuilding output in foreign countries.
D. CONTENTS OF THE THESIS
The following chanter contains a historical overview of the Ame ican shipbuilding
industry and statistics relevant to the current status of commercial shipbuilding.
Chapter III describes the methodology which will be used to make a quantitative
assessment about labor, material, and overhead productivity :n Japan, Europe, and the
United States.
Chapter IV will discuss the findings of the quantitative analysis. An in-depth dis-
cussion of prevailing international cost structures and the impact which currency ex-
change rates play in relative comparisons of shipbuilding productivity will also be
included.
Chapter V will contain qualitative data gathered about fierce international compe-
tition which the U.S. faces. It also will include a discussion of how U.S. government
policy and American business practice have been incompatible with the goal of
competitiveness in U.S. commercial shipbuilding.
Chapter VI will be comprised of the thesis summary, a conclusion, and recommen-




These are bleak times fcr United States (U.S.) shipbuilders. During 1989, the U.S.
completed 10 commercial ships totalling 4078 gross tons (GT).I Put in historical per-
spective, this production figure represents about three percent of the U.S. shipbuilding
output of sailing vessels in the year 1810 [Ref. 2: p. 23]. By contrast, in 1989, Japan
produced 640 ships totalling over 5 million gross tons. Comparing U.S. production to
Japanese production using an automotive analogy is like saying that while the U.S.
produced 10 pick-up trucks in 1989, Japan produced 640 moving vans!
Table 1 on page 4 is a summary of merchant ships completed during 1989 [Ref. 3:
p. 3]. If the 54 countries in Table 1 on page 4 had been ranked by GT produced, U.S.
shipbuilders would have ranked 36th. The U.S. output is just above Malaysia (2758
GT), Peru (3136 GT) and Chile (3372 GT), but below Greece (5219GT), Czechoslovakia
(6172 GT) and Malta (6995 GT) [Ref. 3: p. 3]. The U.S. manufactured three one hun-
dredths of one percent of the world total while Japan produced more than 40 percent
of the world's ships.
A particularly disturbing aspect of the abysmal state of U.S. commercial
shipbuilding is that at various junctures in the history of this nation, U.S. shipbuilders
have excelled in innovative technology and mass production techniques. Indeed,
throughout U.S. history, commercial shipbuilding has been an important vehicle for the
growth of commerce and a symbol of national vitality. Fast American-built privateers
were instrumental in the gaining of U.S. independence from Great Britain and again
during the War of 1812. The swift sail-powered clipper ships of the pre-civil war period
(1820 to the late 1850's) became the bold and colorful world models for merchant ship-
ping and were valued as much for their ability to outrun pirates as for their fast cargo
transit times. These ships permitted the U.S. to be a major player in commerce with
Europe, India and the Orient and were an integral part of the development of California
after its annexation in 1846.
I 'Gross tonnage is calculated from the total volume of all enclosed spaces of a ship measured
in cubic meters using a standard formula" [Ref. 1: p. 3871.
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Table 1. MERCHANT SHIPS COMPLETED DURING 1989
Rank Where Built No. Gross Tonnage Percentage ofWorld Tonnage
1 JAPAN 640 5,364,600 40.53
2 KOREA(SOUTH) 102 3,101,568 23.43.
3 YUGOSLAVIA 26 496,716 3.77
4 GERMAN,FEDERAL 54 430,845 3.26
REPUBLIC OF
5 CHINA, REPUBLIC OF 9 404,892 3.06
TAIWAN OF
6 DENMARK 33 342,960 2.59
7 ITALY 35 327,565 2.47
8 CHINA, PEOPLE'S RE- 20 325,719 2.46PUBLIC OF
9 ROMANIA 17 307,331 2.32
GERMAN DEMO-
10 CRATIC REPUBLIC 33 287,185 2.17
11 SPAIN 130 230,906 1.74
12 POLAND 44 199,391 1.51
13 FINLAND 21 193,970 1.47
14 U.S.S.R. 59 174,277 1.32
15 BRAZIL 11 164,885 1.25
16 FRANCE 27 159,565 1.21
17 UNITED KINGDOM 35 102,393 0.77
18 ARGENTINA 11 89,759 0.88:
19 NETHERLANDS 53 88,814 0.67
20 INDIA 17 80,349 0.61
21 BULGARIA 10 76,603 0.58
22 BELGIUM 2 39,438 0.30
23 MEXICO 2 37,873 0.29
24 CANADA 13 32,980 0.25
25 NORWAY 35 32,710 0.25
26 SINGAPORE 25 23,638 0.18
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Table 1. MERCHANT SHIPS COMPLETED DURING 1989, CONTINUED
Rank Where Built No. Gross Tonnage Percentage ofWorld Tonnage
27 PORTUGAL 16 21,430 0.16
28 TURKEY 13 14,783 0.11
29 EGYPT 2 13,300 0.10
30 SWEDEN 14 12,963 0.10
31 INDONESIA 3 8,300 0.06
32 AUSTRALIA 30 7,304 0.06:
33 MALTA 4 6,995 0.05
34 CZECHOSLOVAKIA 2 6,172 0.05
35 GREECE 4 5,219 0.04
36 UNITED STATES 10 4,078 0.03
37 CHILE 8 3,372 0.03
38 PERU 7 3,136 0.02
39 MALAYSIA 2 2,758 0.02
40 THAILAND 2 2,600 0.10
41 BANGLADESH 5 1,168 0.01
42 HUNGARY 4 1,092 0.01
43 SURINAM 1 700 0.01
44 HONG KONG 3 528 0.00
45 ISRAEL 1 492 0.00
46 SRI LANKA 1 440 0.00
47 IRAN 1 200 0.00
48 UNITED ARAB 1 194 0.00EMIRATES
49 ICELAND 1 143 0.00
50 BRUNEI 1 115 0.00
51 AUSTRIA .... 0.00
52 COLOMBIA .... 0.00
53 NEW ZEALAND .... 0.00
54 VENEZUELA .... 0.00
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In more modem times, the Liberty and Victory ships built just before and during
World War II were essential elements in the U.S. emerging victorious during this crisis.
It is remarkable even by today's standards that during 1945 alone U.S. shipyards com-
pleted 1067 vessels totalling 7,663,362 gross tons [Ref. 2: pp. 14-16, 267]. Even during
their period of decline since World War i1, U.S. designers developed the architecture for
many of the ships currently plying the world's oceans. The cellular containership,
Roll-On, Roll Off (RO-RO) ship, Lighte- Akboard Ship (LASH) barge carrier and Liquid
Natural Gas (LNG) carrier are all American developments [Ref. 2: p. 28].
Today, even U.S. shipowners buy their ships abroad. The 1990 World Orderbook
reveals that U.S. shipowners rank fifth in the world in total deadweight 2 tons (DWT)
being purchased as shown in Table 2 [Ref. 4: pp. i-xv, pp. vi and xii].
Table 2. THE WORLD'S TOP FIVE SHIP BUYING NATIONS IN DWT






United States 60 2,870.440
Of this total, less than 12 percent of ships being purchased by U.S. owners will be U.S.
built as shown in Table 3 on page 7.
Of the 2,870,440 DWTs being built for U.S. owners, 822,827 will be U.S. flag vessels.
The balance will fly the colors of other countries. Virtually all of these ships will be
"flags of convenience". It is instructive to look at the U.S. flag portion of these ships
being purchased and the country of build as shown in Table 4 on page 7 and Table 5
on page 7.
Note that almost 60 percent of the U.S. flag ships being built will be built by foreign
yards. Ironically, despite their recent dismal performance in the commercial sector, U.S.
2 Deadweight is the measurement of the total weight of cargo that a vessel can carry when it
is loaded down to its marks. This includes the weight of fuel, stores, water ballast, fresh water,
passengers and baggage [Ref. 1: p. 3871.
6
Table 3. TOTAL SHIPS BEING BUILT FOR U.S. SHIPOWNERS BY SOURCE
Country of Build Number of Ships Percentage of DWT
Ships being built in U.S. 11 11.54 331,337
yards
Ships being built in for- 49 88.46 2,539,213
eign yards
Total ships in DWT being 60 100 2,870,440
purchased by U.S. owners
Table 4. U.S. FLAG VESSELS ON ORDER 1990
Number Owner/Operator DWT/ Total Country of Typ
of Ships Ship DWT Build
Crude oil
3 Chevron 150,000 450,000 Brazil carrier
2 Transoceanic Cable 7,900 15,800 Singapore Cable ship
Part
2 Chiquita Brands 12,900 25,800 Japan refrigerator
container
Semi-
N ot South s e rsbl2 ODECO listed N/A Korea/U.S. submersible
____ ___ ___ ___ ___ _ ___ ___ oil ring
10 U.S. Navy 30,412 304,120 U.S. product
10_ U.S._Na_ y30,12 304,120_ (Avondale) tanker
1 Matson Navigation 27,107 27,107 U.S.(Natl container
___ ___ __ ___ _  ___ ___ ___ __ ___ _ _ ___ __ Steel) liner
20 Total Ships -- 822,827 Total DWT --
Table 5. U.S. FLAG VESSELS BEING BUILT BY SOURCE
Number of Ships Source of Build DWT Percent
9 Foreign built 491,600 59.75%
11 US Built 331,227 40.25%
20 Total DWT 822,827 100%
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shipbuilders are the unquestioned world leaders in the construction of technologically
sophisticated naval warships. Two examples follow:
1. As a rule, the more technologically complex the vessel, the more competitive is the
U.S. shipyard. In fact there is probably only one shipyard in the entire world ca-
pable of building a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier--much less the three simul-
taneously under construction at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock
Company in the mid 1980's [Ref. 2: p. 104].
2. In the case of the AEGIS ship (U.S. Navy Guided Missile Cruiser) that Japan is
going to be building for itself, they are building a smaller destroyer than we are
currently building and it is going to cost them almost S300 million more to build
than what the larger version can be built for in the United States [Ref. 5: p. 47].
A puzzled observer might reasonably query why an industry that is currently capl-
ble of commercial and military innovation and that has demonstrated periodically
thro -ghout its history a remarkable resiliency in time of crisis has fallen on such hard
times. The current plight of American shipyards is the result of a host of factors. One
principal factor has been the historic lack of a comprehensive commercial maritime
policy which has led to bitter division and parochialism among the principal players in
the maritime arena (shipowners, shipbuilders, Navy, administration, Congress, and var-
ious labor interests). The product of this lack of unified policy has been shipyards that
have failed to increase their productivity during periods of substantial government sub-
sidy. The implementation of a recent piece of important maritime legislation, the Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1970, is a case in point:
The government pledged to support a 300 ship 10 year subsidized program, where
the goals are a 45 percent Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)3 in fiscal year
1971 with a reduction in the ceiling of 2 percentage points a year until a level of 35
percent was reached in fiscal year 1976. After a propitious start in the early 1970's
when CDS rates did fall to the 35% goal, rates began to rise again. By the early
1980's, a rate closer to 65 to 70 percent would have been required to match inter-
national shipbuilding prices. By early 1982, the CDS portion of the 1970 Act was
abandoned altogether. The telling impact of U.S. shipbuilder's failure to improve
productivity was that only 80 of the planned 300 ships were ever built [Ref. 6: pp.
154-.561.
The hindsight of a 1990 perspective reveals that the inability to improve productivity in
the late 1970's and early 1980's led, in this author's opinion, to the justified suspensior.
3 CDS is a direct subsidy paid to U.S. shipyards building U.S. flag ships to offset high con-
struction costs in American shipyards. An amount of subsidy (up to 50 percent) is determined by
estimates of construction cost differentials between U.S. and foreign yards IRef. 6: p. 222].
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of CDS in 1982. This sent the commercial sector of the U.S. shipbuilding industry into
a tailspin from which it may never recover.
The lesson is clear. Any future program which hopes to revitalize the U.S. com-
mercial shipbuilding industry must focus on the factors of production. A viable program
must underscore the importance of competitive labor rates and skill levels; affordable
material costs, the American cost of capital, the process of production, the competencies
and long range planning abilities of our political leaders, and the management abilities
of our shipyard executives.
This thesis will focus on the factors of production, labor, material and capital, for
the U.S. shipbuilding industry. It will provide a comparative analysis of the status of
U.S. shipbuilders with respect to their foreign competitors. It is important to realize that
the issue is not simply one of buying commercial ships from foreign countries who can
produce them more cheaply. The reduction in the number of commercial ships built in
the U.S., while irksome and wounding to national pride, is not disastrous in peacetime.
The concurrent erosion of a military shipbuilding industrial base in a deficit-hobbled
nation, in which an unwary majority believe this nation will never again require the use
of force, could prove injurious to national security. Even if times are indeed to be rela-
tively peaceful in the post-cold war world (and recent experience in the Middle East in-
dicates they will not be), then America ought to utilize and improve upon its shipyard
base to restore its economic vitality and husband its shipyards as valuable industrial as-
sets for an uncertain and potentially hazardous future.
Simply stated, the U.S. needs to target productivity improvements in commercial
shipbuilding to preserve the shipbuilding industrial base in an era when military budgets
are shrinking. The bottom line issue which must be addressed is why "it costs twice as
much and takes twice as long to build a commercial ship in a U.S. shipyard as a com-
parable ship" in a modem foreign shipyard [Ref. 6: p. 109].
Ill. METHODOLOGY
This thesis will historically compare the factors of production (labor, materials, and
overhead) among the world's shipbuilders. Shipbuilding costs in Europe and Asia will
be compared with U.S. costs from the early 1980's to the present time. An effort will be
madc to assess the relative competitiveness of the U.S. shipbuilding industry with respect
to these factors of production.
A. U.S. COMPETITIVENESS: 1990 DEFINITION
As can be surmised from the information in the previous chapter, the U.S. com-
mercial shipbuilding industry will not in the foreseeable future capture any significant
portion of the world market. Indeed, this is not a new phenomenon. The U.S. has not
exported a commercial ship since 1957 [Ref. 7: p. 18], and the heyday of World War II
vintar Liberty and Victory ships is now no more than a historical curiosity.
The U.S. will almost certainly play no role in what some observers forecast to be a
global newbuilding boom in the 1990's [Ref. 8: p. 1]. Competitiveness for U.S. com-
mercial shipbuilders in the 1990's might be defined as:
* Recapturing contracts for aging U.S flag vessels from foreign shipbuilders for U.S.
ships engaged in international trade
* Being cost effective enough to forestall repeal by Congress of existing legislation
which mandates that U.S. ships engaged in the U.S. coastal trades be built in U.S.
yards
* Being productive enough to survive as an industry which, if again subsidized, could
provide both a decent living for those engaged in the industry and the U.S. taxpayer
a reasonably good value for his dollar.
It should perhaps be emphasized at this point that while free trade is certainly a
noble goal in the global shipbuilding arena, virtually all world shipbuilders, except those
in the U.S., are subsidized in some manner. Put differently, if the U.S. government's sole
objective were to obtain quality, low cost commercial ships to replace the aging U.S. flag
fleet and if protectionist legislation were not a barrier, the U.S. commercial shipbuilding
industry would cease to exist.
Having placed reasonable, short term competitive goals for the U.S. shipbuilder into
sharper focus, it is appropriate to discuss the methodology entailed in the historical
analysis of the recent past with respect to the individual costs of production: labor,
material cost, and overhead. After a discussion of the source for each individual factor
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Hourly compensation costs for production workers in the Ship and Boat Build-
ing and Repairing Industry were obtained from the Division of Foreign Labor Statistics,
Office of Productivity and Technology within the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [Ref.
9: pp. 1-3]. This data includes hourly wages in U.S. dollars and in the respective foreign
currency for 13 representative shipbuilding nations. Nations included are the U.S.,
Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway. Spain, and the United Kingdom. This report provides yearly' data
on each country for the period 1981 through 1989. A comparative index is also con-
tained (using U.S. as 100 for each year) for ready analysis. Appendix A contains the
labor data used in this study.
2. Material
For the purpose of this study, steel was gauged to be the principal material ele-
nient in shipbuilding. International steel prices for heavy plate steel were obtained from
yearly editions of the Metal Bulletin Handbook and its successor, Metal Bulletin's Prices
and Data Book [Ref. 10 pp. 157-241 and Ref. 11 pp. 183-240]. The germane unit of
measurement used was the metric ton. Since the periodicity af published market prices
varied greatly from country to country, a weighted yearly average price by country
converted to U.S. dollars per metric ton was used in this study. Prices in foreign cur-
rencies were converted into U.S. dollar using tables provided by the Bureau of Labc
Statistics (Ref. 12: pp. 10 and 181. A currency conversion table is provided for the period
1981 through 1989 in Appendix B.
It should be noted here that the international steel industry is certainly not
without its eccentricities. The thickness of heavy plate is defined differently at various
times in different countries. It is sometimes quoted separately from medium plate and
at other times together with medium plate. If quoted separately, heavy plate prices were
used. If heavy plate prices varied on the basis of minor differences in quality, steel
Making process, or Free on Board (FOB) pricing between differing plants. then a
weighted average was taken to accommodate the variation. No effort was made to cal-
culate discounts offered on the basis of quantity purchased. Treaty of Paris prices for
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"Structural and Shipbuilding Plate" were used in the case of the United Kingdom. Ap-
pendix C contains data gathered for the period on steel prices.
Korean steel prices, while unavailable in the Metal Bulletin [Ref. 10: pp. 157-241
and Ref. 11: pp.18 3-2401 were taken from Jenks and Lamer [Ref. 13: p.16] and Carson
and Lamb [Ref. 7: p. 7]. for specific years and used to make qualitative comments about
material costs in that nations's shipbuilding industry in Chapter V.
Heavy plate steel prices were not available for Norway. In order to include this
country in the study, Swedish heavy plate prices, converted to dollars with a nominal
charge attached for import transportation, were used for Norway.
Heavy plate prices for Spain were not available for the period 1981 through
1985. Prices for 1981 through 1985 were obtained by comparing the relationship of
Spanish steel prices during 1986 through 1989 to other European prices and projecting
that trend back through 1981.
3. Overhead
The sum of fixed and variable overhead was considered to be that portion of
cost which could not be directly related to labor or material. These numbers were ex-
tracted from the four cost structure models detailed in Section C below. Fixed overhead
was considered to be comprised of "allotments for the replacement of facilities and re-
payment of borrowed capital and working capital" [Ref. 13: p. 201. A principal deter-
minant of fixed overhead was considered to be the cost of capital prevalent in the
nations of various major shipbuilders. Variable overhead was considered to consist of
costs such as "light, heat and power related to production, insurance, drydock charges,
management and administrative expense, data processing expense, sales expense and
yard maintenance and security" [Ref. 13: p.201. It is significant to note that indirect
burden costs for yard labor, i.e., fringe benefits for production workers, are included
under this category. This is, however, consistent with the manner in which these figures
are reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (who exclude benefits from hourly wage
comparisons) as well as the studies by Jenks and Lamer [Ref. 13 pp. 1-20], and Jenks
and Landsburg [Ref. 14 pp. 44-661, and Carson and Lamb [Ref. 7: pp. 1-32] which are
used extensively in this paper.
C. THE MODEL
In order to gain insight into the relative productivity of the world's shipbuilders
during the period under consideration, (1981 through 1989), one must understand three
things:
12
1. The cost structures prevalent in different nations
2. The general trend of newbuilding (new commercial construction) prices during the
period
3. The relationship of Japanese prices to costs.
1. The Cost Structures
Four studies, Jenks and Lamer (1982), [Ref. 13: pp. 1-20], Jenks and Landsburg
(1988) [Ref. 14: pp. 44-66], Porter and Cho (1985) [Ref. 15: pp. 539-5671, and Carson and
Lamb (1990) [Ref. 7: pp. 1-32], are used extensively to conveniently segment the nine
year period into two distinct periods: the steady fall of newbuilding prices from 1981 to
a trough in 1985 and the rapid rise of prices from 1985 through 1989.
The 1982 Jenks and Lamer study [Ref. 13: pp. 1-20] is based on cost structures
prevalent in 1981 in Japan, Northern Europe, and the U.S. It provides a useful starting
point for the decade of the 1980's. It focuses on the relative ship construction costs for
building a 90,000 DWT tanker.
The 1988 Jenks and Landsburg [Ref. 14: pp. 44-661 study is a continuation of
Jenks work from 1982 covering the period 1981 though 1985. It focuses on the major
tanker builders of that era, Japan and Korea. This study was used as a basis for estab-
lishing Japanese cost and pricing relationships in 1985. Porter and Cho's [Ref. 15: pp.
539-5671 work centers on global marketing strategies in shipbuilding. However, useful
cost comparisons found in this study enabled the author to draw conclusions about rel-
ative cost structures between Japan and Northern Europe at the midpoint of the nine
year period covered in this thesis.
The 1990 Carson and Lamb study [Ref. 7: pp. 1-321 formats cost structures in
a fashion similar to the original Jenk's study [Ref. 13: pp. 1-20). It defines and segments
the total cost structure into the same principal categories as do the other studies. It in-
cludes cost percentages reputed to exist for labor, material, and overhead in the U.S. and
cot-nares these to percentages prevalent in Japan and Northern Europe. It does not
reference cost structures relative to a specific ship type, but pertains to relative
shipbuilding cost structures in general. The relationships of these four studies are shown
in Table 6 on page 14.
In order to draw conclusions about productivity in different nations on the basis
of relative cost structures, the information derived from the four studies is considered to
be valid for shipbuilding construction cost structures in general. The methodology of
this thesis will be to align and knit these four studies together in order to obtain an
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Table 6. COMPARISON OF FOUR SHIPBUILDING COST STRUCTURE
STUDI ES
Study Period Covered Nevsbuilding Prices Year Written
Jenks & Lamer 1981 High 1982
Jenks &Jenksbug1981-1985 Low 1988Landsburg
Porter & Cho 1985 Low 1986
Carson & Lamb 1989 High 1990
overall picture of productivity in different nations. The melding of the four studies is
shown in Table 7 on page 15. The U.S. is considered as 100 percent for each of the
three periods depicted in the table. Two examples for interpreting Table 7 on page 15
follow:
1. In 1981, Japanese shipbuilding costs were 45.4 percent of U.S. costs
2. In 1989, Northern European shipbuilding costs were 96 percent of U.S. costs
Some additional explanatorn notes are necessary. The 1982 Jenks study [Ref.
13: pp. 1-201 was used in conjunction with the Carson and Lamb study [Ref. 7: pp. 1-321
to obtain costs structures for the U.S. during the 1985 period.
One cautionary note about the Carson and Lamb study [Ref. 7: pp. 1-321 should
oe made at this point. While the relative percentages allocated to the major costs cate-
gories (labor, material, and overhead) were not considered to be unreasonable, those
allocated to fixed and variable overhead did seem surprising as shown in Fable 8 on
page 16. For example, if taken at face value, Japanese fixed overhead costs rose by a
factor of eight, from 2 in 1985 as estimated by Jenks and Landsburg in Fable 7 to 16 in
1989 as estimated by Carson and Lamb in Table 8 on page 16. Similarly, Northern
European overhead costs rose by a factor of ten, from 1.9 in 1985 to 20 in 1989.
(Compare Table 7 on page 15, Models 2 and 3, to Table 8 on page 16). For this reason,
the percentages allocated for fixed and variable overhead were reversed within each
country in Table 7, i.e., the 9 percent allocated to fixed overhead in Table 7 on page 15
for Japan in 1989 was Carson and Lamb's estimate of variable overhead for Japan
shown in Fable 8 on page 16. The 10 percent allocated to Northern European in
Table 7 on page 15 in 1989 for fixed overhead was Carson and Lamb's estimate of var-
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Table 7. FOUR COST STRUCTURE MODELS: A CHRONOLOGICAL COM-
PARISON OF RELATIVE WORLD SHIPBUILDING COSTS
MODEL 1: 1981 JENKS and LARNER
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 7.3 10.6 20.6
Material 28.6 32.0 42.8
Fixed Overhead 2.3 3.2 16.6
Variable Overhead 7.2 10.2 20.0
Total 45.4 56.00 100.0
MODELS 2 and 3: 1985 JENKS and LANDSBURG, 1985 PORTER and CHO
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 13.3 16.0 22.3
Material 16.3 18.1 41.4
Fixed Overhead 2.0 1.9 14.3
Variable Overhead 6.2 6.2 22
Total 37.8 42.2 100.0
MODEL 4: 1989 CARSON and LAMB ("-ith Revised Overhead Estimates)
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 16 30 24
Material 34 36 40
Fixed Overhead 9 10 12
Variable Overhead 16 20 24
Total 75 96 100
iable overhead in Table 8 on page 16. This author feels justified in performing this re-
versal for three reasons:
1. The knowledge that Japanese shipbuilders are currently operating very close to
100% capacity and it seems unreponnable to conclude that greater utilization of
existing plant and equipment with minimal slack would cause skyrocketing ex-
penditures on fixed cost [Ref. 16: p. 3781
2. The U.S. data for estimating commercial ships is based on five orders since 1982
3. The reversed numbers seem to fit the historical pattern much more closely.
Table 9 on page 17 converts the numbers from Table 7 into individual cost
structures by region. Table 10 on page 18, Table 11 on page 18, and Table 12 on page
15
Table 8. CARSON AND LAMB COST STRUCTURE ESTIMATES FOR 1989
Cost Component Japan Europe U.S.
Labor 16 30 24
Material 34 36 40
Fixed Overhead 16 20 24
Variable Overhead 9 10 12
Total 75 96 100
19 reconstruct the intervening years 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, and 1988 in a linear
fashion to include for Japan (Table 10) and Europe (Table 11) the impact on cost
structures of the newbuilding price plunge from 1981 to 1985 and the sharp rise from
1985 to 1989. Using these four studies as points of references, the impact on cost
structure of a decrease in prices from 1981, the starting point of the nine year period.
until 1985 (the midpoint of the period) was assumed to occur on a constant basis; i.e.,
for Japan the increase of six index points in the labor index from 7.3 in 1981 to 13.3 in
1985 as show in Tables 7 and 10 was assumed to occur at the rate of 1.5 index points
per year or 6 index points over four years. The rise in labor of 2.7 index points from 13.3
in 1985 to 16 in 1989 (the nine year endpoint), shown in Tables 7 and 10, was assumed
to occur at the rate of 2.7,'4 or .675 index points per year. (Numbers are rounded in
Tables 10, 11 and 12, to ease further computations). In Table 11 for the U.S., a single
linear trend from 1981 to 1989 was selected for two reasons:
1. Very few commercial ships were built during this period and consequently the data,
if it were available would be very sketchy.
2. When construction differential subsidies were suspended in 1982, it is fairly safe to
assume that U.S. shipbuilders were in no relative position to drastically alter their
cost structure to vie for market share when newbuilding prices bottomed out in
1985.
Cost structures in Tables 10, 11 and 12 have been left in terms relative to one another
to facilitate analysis.
2. Newbuilding Prices
Newbuilding prices experienced dramatic change from 1981 to 1989. Prices for
newbuilding of all types reached their highest levels since the previous peak in 1974
during 1981. Prices declined steadily during 1982, 1983. and 19, bottoming out in
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Table 9. COST STRUCTURES BY PERCENTAGE IN LOCAL TERMS:
1981-1989
MODEL 1: 1981 JENKS and LARNER
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 16.1 18.9 20.6
Material 63.0 57.2 42.8
Fixed Overhead 5.1 j.7 16.6
Variable Overhead 15.8 18.2 20.0
Total 100 100 100
MODELS 2 and 3: 1985 JENKS and LANDSBURG, 1985 PORTER and CHO
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 35.2 37.9 22.3
Material 43.1 42.9 41.4
Fixed Overhead 5.3 4.5 14.3
Variable Overhead 16.4 14.7 22.0
Total 100 100 100
MODEL 4: 1989 CARSON and LAMB (with Revised Overhead Estimates)
COST COMPONENT JAPAN EUROPE U.S.
Labor 21.3 31.3 24
Material 45.4 37.5 40
Fixed Overhead 12.0 10.4 12
Variable Overhead 21.3 20.8 24
Total 100 100 100
1985. During 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989 prices climbed steeply. In 1989 newbuilding
prices were more than double the level achieved during 1985 and surpassed those of the
previous high experienced during 1981. Most experts have explained this rise in prices
as caused by a rash of newbuilding activity associated with replacement shipping for
tonnage built during the boom period of the early 1980's [Ref. 17: pp. 1-2 and Ref. 18:
p. 49]. During the latter part of the 1970's and the mid 1980's when newbuilding prices
were low and competitors slashed prices to maintain market share, the global response
was to reduce shipbuilding capacity by closing underutilized yards [Ref. 19: p. 47]. The
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Table 10. JAPANESE RELATIVE COST STRUCTURE: 1981-1989
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE- OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL HEAD OVER-
HEAD
1981 7.3 28.6 2.3 7.2 45.4
1982 8.8 25.5 2.2 7.0 43.5
1983 10.3 22.6 2.2 6.8 41.9
1984 11.8 19.4 2.1 6.5 39.8
1985 13.3 16.3 2.0 6.2 37.8
1986 14.0 20.7 3.8 8.7 47.2
1987 14.7 25.2 5.5 11.1 56.5
1988 15.3 29.6 7.3 13.6 65.8
1989 16.0 34.0 9.0 16.0 75.0
Table 11. NORTHERN EUROPEAN RELATIVE COST STRUCTURE:
1981-1989
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE- OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL H D OVER-
HEAD HEAD
1981 10.6 32.0 3.2 10.2 56.0
1982 12.0 28.5 2.9 9.2 52.6
1983 13.3 25.1 2.6 8.2 49.2
1984 14.7 21.6 2.2 7.2 45.7
1985 16.0 18.1 1.9 6.2 42.0
1986 19.5 22.6 3.9 9.7 55.7
1987 23.0 27.1 6.0 13.1 69.2
1988 26.5 31.5 8.0 16.6 82.6
1989 30 36 10 20 96
surge in prices after 1985 reflects both the demand for new tonnage and reduced capacity
for building.
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Table 12. U.S. RELATIVE COST STRUCTURE: 1981-1989
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE- OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL HEAD OVER-
HEAD
1981 20.6 42.8 16.6 20.0 100.00
1982 21.0 42.5 16.0 20.5 100.00
1983 21.4 42.1 15.5 21.0 100.00
1984 21.8 41.8 14.9 21.5 100.00
1985 22.3 41.4 14.3 22.0 100.00
1986 22.7 41.1 13.7 22.5 100.00
1987 23.1 40.7 13.2 23.0 100.00
1988 23.5 40.4 12.6 23.5 100.00
1989 24.0 40.0 12 24 100.00
Figure 1 reflects newbuilding price trends during the period 1981 through 1989.
This graph was constructed by taking a composite weighted average of deadweight
tonnage ordered in the world during this period [Ref. 19: p. 61 and Ref. 20: pp. 684-687].
Tonnage was divided into two types, tankers of four different classes and four different
classes of bulk and combined carriers. Weights were assigned on the basis of total
tonnage in the world orderbook. Appendix D contains the details.
The graph reflects the change in preference from bulk and combined carriage
tonnage from 1981 through 1986 to tanker tonnage during 1987, 1988, and 1989. Ap-
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Figure 1. Composite Newbuilding Prices (1981-1989)
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3. Japanese Price/Cost Relationship
Japanese shipbuilders dominated the world during the 1980's, manufacturing
better than 40 percent of the world's new shipping during the decade [Ref. 21: p. 51.
However, impressive as this nation's performance has been in the shipbuilding arena, its
commanding market position has not been achieved painlessly.
Faced with Korean competition whose hourly labor rates were one-third of
Japan's throughout much of the decade, Japan was forced to slash prices to maintain
market share [Ref. 14: p.451.
On the basis of Jenks and Lamer's 1982 study [Ref. 13: p. 1321; its extension,
the 1988 Jenks and Landsburg work [Ref. 14: p. 46]; and other shipbuilding literature
[Ref. 22: p. 1321, after a breakeven year in 1981, the shipbuilding industry in Japan
continues to accumulate losses and is not expected to turn a profit until 1991. As
Table 13 indicates, shipbuilding prices have not covered total shipbuilding cost since
1981.
Table 13. JAPANESE COST/PRICE RELATIONSHIPS: 1981-1989













In order to draw quantitative conclusions about productivity in different nations, it
is necessary to convert relative cost and price structures into a common currency and
extract measures of relative productivity such as manhours expended per ship and metric
tons of steel used per ship.
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Table 14 on page 22 converts composite newbuilding prices (CNP) (in millions of
dollars) provided in Figure 1 into total cost by area. This is accomplished by converting
total relative costs from Tables 10, 11 and 12 into the coefficients shown in columns (2),
(5) and (7) of Table 14. On the basis of their manufacturing dominance, Japan was
chosen as the building block for Northern European and U.S. cost structures. For ex-
ample, in the year 1981, the Japanese cost coefficient (JCC) is 45.4,'45.4 or 1, the
Northern European cost coefficient (NECC) is 56/45.4 or 1.23 and the U.S. cost coeffi-
cient (USCC) is 100/45.4 or 2.2. Column 3 of Table 14 models Japan's priLe setting
dominance in the shipbuilding marketplace (Ref 15: p. 5581. In other words, the
Japanese relationship between cost and price is the method used to convert the com-
posite newbuilding prices to newbuilding costs in each of the three areas. Since Japan
priced below cost during much of the nine year period, the Japanese price coefficients
(JPC) in this column are the reciprocals of those listed in Table 13 on page 21.
Table 14. COMPOSITE NEWBUILDING COSTS BY AREA: 1981-1989
YR CNP JCC JPC JSC NECC NESC USCC USSC
-- Col(1) CoI(2) Col(3) Co!(4) Col(5) Col(6) Co1(7) Col(8)
81 36.592 1 1.0 $36.592 1.23 S45.136 2.20 580.599
82 25.084 1 1.13 S28.264 1.21 S34.177 2.30 $64.974
83 22.615 1 1.29 $29.189 1.17 $34.264 2.39 S69.643
84 20.027 1 1.51 $30.230 1.15 $34.711 2.51 S75.954
85 17.965. 1 1.82 $32.664 1.11 $36.294 2.65 S86.414
86 21.824 1 1.60 $34.918 1.18 $41.206 2.12 S73.979
87 26.804 1 1.43 $38.291 1.22 S46.898 1.77 567.772
88 38.377 1 1.29 $49.679 1.26 $62.363 1.52 S75.500
89 45.277 1 1.18 $53.582 1.28 $68.585 1.33 $71.443
Columns (4) Japanese ship cost (JSC), (6) Northern European ship cost (NESC),
and (8) U.S. ship cost (USSC) in Table 14 reflect the newbuilding cost for the composite
ship type by year for each of the respective areas. Table 15 on page 23, Table 16 on
page 23, and Table 17 on page 24 convert the data provided in Table 10 on page 18,
Table 11 on page 18, and Table 12 on page 19 from relative percentages to local per-
centages of cost for Japan, Northern Europe and the U.S. For example, in Japan during
1981, labor represented 7.3/45.4 of the total cost or 16.1 percent.
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Table 15. LOCAL COST PERCENTAGES FOR JAPANESE SHIPBUILDERS
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE- OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL OVER-HEAD HEAD
Co1(l) Col(2) Col(3) Col(4) Col(5) Col(6)
1981 16.1 63.0 5.1 15.8 100
1982 20.9 58.0 5.15 15.95 100
1983 25.7 53.0 5.2 16.1 100
1984 30.4 48.1 5.25 16.25 100
1985 35.2 43.1 5.3 16.4 100
1986 31.7 43.7 7.0 17.6 100
1987 28.2 44.2 8.7 18.9 100
1988 24.8 44.8 10.3 20.1 100
1989 21.3 45.4 12.0 21.3 100
Table 16. LOCAL COST PERCENTAGES FOR NORTHERN EUROPEAN
SHIPBUILDERS
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE- OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL OVER-HEAD HEAD
Col(1) Co1(2) Co!(3) Co!(4) Co1(5) Co1(6)
1981 18.9 57.2 5.7 18.2 100
1982 23.7 53.6 5.4 17.3 100
1983 '8.4 50.0 5.1 16.5 100
1984 33.1 46.5 4.8 15.6 100
1985 37.9 42.9 4.5 14.7 100
1986 36.3 41.6 6.0 16.1 100
1987 34.6 40.2 7.4 17.8 100
1988 33.0 38.9 8.9 19.2 100
1989 31.3 .37.5 10.4 20.8 100
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Table 17. LOCAL COST PERCENTAGES FOR U.S. SHIPBUILDERS
FIXED VARI-
YEAR LABOR MATE OVER- ABLE TOTALRIAL HOVER- DHEAD
Col(1) Co!(2) Col(3) Col(4) Col(5) Col(6)
1981 20.6 42.8 16.6 20 100
1982 21.0 42.5 16.0 20.5 100
1983 21.5 42.1 15.4 21 100
1984 21.9 41.8 14.8 21.5 100
1985 22.3 41.4 14.3 22 100
1986 22.7 41.1 13.7 22.5 100
1987 23.2 40.7 13.1 23 100
1988 23.6 40.4 12.5 23.5 100
1989 24.0 40 12 24 100
1. Labor Productivity
Labor produc:., ity can be extracted from the composite ship cost (CSC) data
by year and country using Equation (3.1) to solve for manhours (MHRS) per ship.
Equation (3.1) defines the basic relationship of wages (S/MHR) and manhours per ship
(MHRS/SHIP) to the percentage of the composite ship cost (CSC) which is labor.
(S/MHRS) x (MHRS/SHIP) = (% LABOR) x CSC (3.1)
Equation (3.2) converts this relationship to data described in Appendix A
(wages per hour by country), Tables 15, 16 and 17 (Col 2) (percentage of cost which is
labor in each respective area: Japan, Northern Europe, and the U.S.), and Table 14 (Col
4, 6 or 8) whic.h is the ship costs in each respective area. The symbol (x) is used to
represent the unknown measure of labor productivity (MHRS/SHIP).
(Appendix A wages) x (x) = Table 15,16, or 17 (Col 2 ) x Table 14(Col4, 6, or 8)(3.2)
Equation (3.3) indicates that a solution for the unknown measure of labor productivity
(x), MHRS/SHIP can be obtained by dividing the right hand side of equation (3.2) by
Appendix A (wages per hour by country).
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Table 14 (Col4, 6 or 8)
x = (MHRS/SHIP) = Table 15,16 or 17 (Col 2) X [Appendix A wages] (3.3)
2. Material Productivity
Material productivity can be extracted from the composite ship cost data by
year and by country using equation (3.4) to solve for metric tons of steel (MTS).
Equation (3.4) defines the basic relationship of steel price (S/MTS) and metric tons of
steel used per ship (MTS/SHIP) to the percentage of composite ship cost (CSC) which
is material.
S/MTS x MTS/SHIP = (% MA TL) x CSC (3.4)
Equation (3.5) converts this relationship to data described in Appendix C (steel price by
country), Tables 15, 16, and 17 (Col 3) (percentage of cost which is material in each re-
spective area: Japan, Northern Europe, and the U.S.) and Table 14 (Col 4, 6, ",. S))
which is the ship cost in each respective area. The symbol (y) is used to represent the
unknown measure of material productivity (MTS/SHIP).
(Appendix C price) x (y) = Table 15,16, or 17(Cot3) x Table 14(Col4, 6or8) (3.5)
Equation (3.6) indicates that a solution for the unknown measurement of material pro-
ductivity (y), (MTS/SHIP) can be obtained by dividing the right hand side of equation
(3.5) by Appendix C (steel price per metric ton by country).
Table 14 (Col4,6 or 8
y = (MTS/SHIP) = Table 15,16, or 17(Col 3 ) x [Appendix Cprice- (3.6)
The number of metric tons of steel used per ship is being utilized to be repre-
sentative of the units of raw and finished material used in ship construction. Propulsion
equipment, pipe, instrumentation for the bridge and engine room, various pumps, gen-
erators, electrical equipment, air conditioning equipment and a host of other machinery
are required in constructing a ship. Detailed historical cost accounting methods and
accurate information on ship suppliers throughout the globe would be necessary to
correctly apportion and quantify unit costs for these items. Clearly, such an effort is
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is hoped that relative productivity comparisons based




Quantified comparative measurement of overhead productivity by country will
not be attempted in this thesis. Useful information pertinent to fixed overhead on the
cost of capital in Japan, the U.S., West Germany and Great Britain will be provided later
in this work. Other qualitative information on variable overhead will be provided as
available for comparison of countries' variable overhead costs.
Regrettably, there is no simple unit of measurement such as hourly wage rate
or steel price per metric ton for extracting a unit of overhead productivity from the
composite ship cost.
4. Country Selection
The following countries have been selected for inclusion in this study based













It is unfortunate that a more comprehensive effort could not have been per-
formed for South Korea, the world's second largest shipbuilder. If data for cost struc-
tures had been available, a complete analysis similar to that used for Japan, Northern
Europe and the U.S. would have been conducted.
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, while not considered Northern European
shipbuilders have been included for two reasons:
I. Each has a rather considerable shipbuilding capability
2. They provide a source of contrast with other European nations.
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These countries will be classified in the following chapter as Southern European
shipbuilders.
Important shipbuilding nations such as Peoples' Republic of China, Brazil,
Yugoslavia, and other former eastern block countries have been excluded from the
quantitative portion of the study due to a lack of data on cost structure and unavail-
ability of steel prices. However, qualitative comments on these nations and their im-




This chapter will cover two major topic areas. It will first explain the significance
of the differences between the cost structures in Japan, Europe and the United States.
For each area the individual components of cost: labor, material and overhead (both
fixed and variable) will be discussed. The impact of changes in wages and material prices
to the local cost structure composition will be addressed. Since the focus of this study
is the U.S. shipbuilding industry, an effort will be made to draw attention to the relevant
impact of differing foreign cost structures as they relate to the structure which exists in
the U.S. Second, the results of the productivity study will be presented. An effort will
be made to highlight the driving factors in the historical differences in labor and material
productivity among the nations within the context of the methodology discussed in
Chapter I II.
B. COST STRUCTURE
The cost structures extracted from the four studies display -ontrasting shipbuilding
industries in the respective areas. The Japanese and Northern European cost structures
underwent significant change during the nine year period. The U.S. cost structure re-
mained remarkably stable. Differences in wages and prices in the respective countries
drove changes to the cost structures. However, the effect of currency changes played a
significant role throughout the decade in the relative differences in shipbuilding costs.
I. Japan
Labor costs as a percentage of total costs in local terms more than doubled from
slightly greater than 16 percent in 1981 to more than 35 percent in 1985, but dropped
back to around 21 percent by 1989. Japanese shipbuilders reduced the percentage in
local terms of costs expended on material by nearly 18 percent from 63 percent in 1981
to 45.4 percent in 1989. Overhead costs grew during the 1980's by nearly 21 percent.
Overall, Japanese relative costs increased from 45.5 percent of U.S. cost in 1984 to 75
percent of U.S. cost in 1989 although much of this increase could be attributed to the
weakened value of the dollar against the yen.
a. Japanese Labor Costs
The rise in wages in yen from 1981 until 1985 accounted for most of the
sharp rise in the percentage of costs expended on labor between 1981 and 1985. Figure
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2 displays two line graphs. The upper graph represents the percentage of total cost in
local terms expended on labor. The lower graph represents the hourly earnings in yen
for Japanese shipyard workers. Note that from 1981 until 1987, labor cost percentages
and wages move in the same direction. Only during 1988 and 1989 do wages in yen and
labor cost percentages move in different directions. The seeming anomaly of 1988 is a
reflection of Japanese shipbuilders' attempts to lure back workers laid off during the
newbuilding price slump of the mid 1980's.
With strong demand in the steel and construction industr for skilled labor and a
bad image shipbuilders got for allegedly behaving selfishly in sacking their employ-
ees recruitment is difficult. And wages in the steel industry are double those of
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Figure 2. Japanese Labor Cost vs Japanese Wages (198 1-1989)
It is also significant to note that if the trend of rising wage increases con-
tinues, it could have the impact of pushing both labor cost and overall costs upward.
Also of interest is the fact that Japanese shipyard w orkers in 1989 earned
S 14.67 per hour compared to U.S. workers who earned S 14.77 an hour. This contrasts
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sharply with the relationship that existed between the two nations in the not so distant
past and debunks the notion that Japan gained competitive advantage on the basis of
inexpensive labor. Table 18 on page 30 summarizes the changes in Japanese wages in
dollars per hour ($/hr) [Ref. 9: p. 3].
Table 18. JAPANESE AND U.S. SHIPYAPD PRODUCTION WORKER
WAGES IN $/HR
Countries 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989
U.S. 6.84 11.22 14.57 14.33 14.77
Japan 3.92 6.75 8.12 14.83 14.67
b. Japanese Material Costs
Local material costs as a percentage of the total dropped markedly during
the first half of the decade and rose only marginally from 1985 through 1989. Figure 3
displays two line graphs. One line represents local material costs as a percentage of the
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Figure 3. Local Japanese Material Cost vs Steel Prices in Yen (1981-1989)
It is interesting to contrast the currency conversion effect on material prices
during the period. Figure 4 shows the currency impact on the relative cost structure.
Note that by converting yen to dollars, the sharp downturn of steel prices in yen, shown
in Figure 3, from 1981 through 1985 appears relatively flat when mcasured in dollars,
and the sharp dip in price from 1985 to 1986 measured in yen actually translates to a
S70 increase in dollar price during this period. The modest rise from 60,119 yen in 1986
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Figure 4. Relative Japanese Material Cost vs Steel Price in Dollars (1981-1989)
In summary, material costs showed a marked decline in yen during most of
the nine year period. However, in relative terms because of a weakening dollar which
declined from 225 yen in 1981 to 138 yen in 1989, the relative percentage of shipbuilding
cost allocated to material grew from 28.6 to 34 index points.
c. Japanese Overhead Costs
Japanese overhead costs remained remarkably constant in local and relative
terms throughout the early part of the decade, but climbed sharply in the latter part of
the decade. However, despite the rise in the percentage of total cost allocated to over-
head, Japan still enjoys a significant advantage over its competitors with respect to rel-
ative overhead costs. The advantage in fixed overhead cost results from a number of
factors which are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Japan experienced tremendous production throughput using existing ca-
pacity. From 1981 to 1989, Japan produced an amazing 63,581,412 gross tons (GT) of
shipping. Table 19 on page 33 contrasts Japanese production to U.S. production during
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the entire decade of the 1980's [Ref. 3: p. 3, Ref. 23: pp. 76-77, Ref. 24: pp. 28-60, Ref.
25: pp. 1-2, and Ref. 26: pp. 1-21. The amount of throughput in tons produced translated
into very efficient use of plant, equipment and machinery resources since the high vol-
ume of production lowered the fixed costs per unit.
Table 19. JAPANESE PRODUCTION VS U.S. PRODUCTION IN GT OF
COMMERICIAL SHIPS DURING THE PERIOD 1981-1989










Learning curve and experience curve effects were more fully realized because
of the quantity and diversity of ships produced. Large orders for families of sister ships
meant reduced fixed costs per ship. One area where the effects of mass production on
fixed overhead costs are most pronounced was in the fabrication of engineering
drawings. Ishikawajima Harma Heavy Industries Company Ltd. "IHI", a leading
Japanese shipbuilder, employs a technique called, "Module Design", to minimize design
cost.
That is, if parts of ships are similar, design modules from the previous history are
adapted as is or with some improvement. It is important not to waste energy and
resources by treating every new design as if there were no precedent. Data accu-
mulated from previous designs are the company's valuable property. Retrieval of
and combining this data have proved to be effective by using the computer-aided
design system, CAD [Ref. 27: p. 1101.
In essence, this entails minimal design costs since old designs are readily
accessed by computer. Clearly, such a database also provides the supplemental benefit
of making it easier to bid on new ship construction projects. Successful techniques in-
deed appear to breed further triumphs.
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Japan enjoyed a relatively low cost of capital. The cost of capital is defined
as the rate of interest corporations pay on loans used to finance investment in new ma-
chinery and equipment. A relatively low rate of interest tends to spark investment in
more modem equipment and machinery which can be used to boost productivity.
Higher rates of interest tends to discourage investment in new productivity enhancing
technology. Table 20 displays the cost of capital in Japan and the United States from
1981 though 1988 for equipment and machinery with a physical life of 20 years.
Table 20 also shows the gap between the two nations [Ref. 28: p. 16].
Table 20. COST OF CAPITAL (1981-1988) FOR EQUIPMENT AND MA-
CHINERY WITH A LIFE OF 20 YEARS IN U.S. AND JAPAN
Year U.S. Japan Gap
1981 13.5 8.8 4.7
1982 11.5 8.5 3.0
1983 10.6 8.8 1.8
1984 11.3 8.4 2.9
1985 11.1 8.3 3.2
1986 9.1 7.8 1.3
1987 10.2 7.0 3.2
1988 11.2 T 7.2 4.0
Japanese shipbuilders also enjoyed a competitive advantage in variable
overhead costs with respect to U.S. shipyards. One explanation for this advantage is the
more costly medical benefits accrued by U.S. workers. Medical benefits are included as
an indirect cost and as such are usually allocated to variable overhead cost in proportion
to direct labor manhours. According to Carson and Lamb [Ref. 7: pp. 8-9] there exists
a $3.40 per manhour advantage for health care costs in a Japanese yard compared to a
U.S. yard.
2. Northern Europe
Labor costs in Northern Europe rose significantly in local terms from 1981 to
1989. The rise was precipitous from 1981 to 1985 moving from 18.9 percent in 1981 to
37.9 percent in 1985, but dropping back to 31.3 percent in 1989. Material costs shrunk
from a high of 57.2 percent in 1981 to a low of 37.5 percent in 1989. Overhead costs
grew by 7.3 percent from 23.9 percent in 1981 to 31.2 percent in 1989. Overall relative
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European cost ballooned from 56 percent of U.S. cost to 96 percent of U.S. cost in the
1980's.
a. Northern European Labor Costs
Northern European wages outstripped those in Japan, the U.S. and South-
ern Europe during the 1980's. By 1989, West German shipyard workers had become the
highest paid in the world, earning S20.16 per hour. They were followed closely by
Finland at S19.66 per hour, Norway at 519.63 per hour, and Denmark at 516.23 per
hour. By contrast Japanese workers earned S14.67 per hour and U.S. workers earned
S14.77 per hour in 1989. Other European shipyard workers gained wage increases during
the 1980's, but earned less that their Northern European counterparts. In 1988, Spanish
workers earned S10.85 per hour while in 1989, British workers earned S10.06 per hour.
Figure 5 is indicative of the role wages played in shaping the local and relative labor cost
structure present in Northern Europe. The uppermost line graph illustrates the pattern
of labor cost in local percentage. The middle graph shows wages in deutschemarks
throughout the 1980's and the lower graph indicates the changes over time of the relative
Northern European cost structure. The fact that wages in deutschemarks continued to
increase, while the local percentage of labor cost declined, is indicative of the fact that
increases in local overhead percentages outstripped even wage gains after 1985 as a
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Figure 5. European Local and Relative Labor Cost vs Wages in Deutschemark
(1981-1989)
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b. Northern European Mfaterial Costs
Local material costs as a percentage of the total dropped throughout the
decade. Relative material costs declined from 1981 to 1985 and rose from 1985 to 1989.
Figure 6 depicts local material cost plotted against steel prices in French francs, Danish
krone, and Finnish markha. It would seem that rising steel prices were less important
than the increases in local labor and overhead percentages in shaping the declining di-
rection of the percentage of cost allocated to material.
Figure 7 shows French, Finnish, and Danish steel prices plotted in U.S.
dollars versus relative material cost percentages. The shapes of the three European
curves bear remarkable similarity and seem to correspond reasonably well to the
Northern European relative cost. It is significant to note that currency exchange effects
between these three European countries and the U.S. occur in the same direction and
are primarily responsible for the drastic differences in the appearances between Figure
6 and Figure 7.
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Figure 6. Local European Material Cost vs Steel Prices in Various European Cur-
rencies (1981-1989)
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Figure 7. Northern European Steel Prices in Dollars vs Relative Material Cost
(1981-1989)
Figure 8 plots the currency exchange rates of the Danish krone, French
franc and Finnish markha against the U.S. dollar. By contrasting Figure 7 to Figure 8,
it is apparent that a stronger dollar drove dollar-denominated European steel prices
lower during the earlier part of the decade and a weaker dollar drove dollar-denominated
steel prices upward in the latter part of the decade.
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c.~~ Northern Euopa Ovehea Costs
Northern European overhead costs in local and relative terms declined
modestly from 1981 until 1985, but climbed dramatically during the latter part of the
decade. In relative terms Northern European shipbuilders enjoyed a significant advan-
tage over U.S. builders but lagged behind Japan.
A significant advantage enjoyed by European builders over their American
counterparts with respect to fixed overhead exists in the area of cost of capital.
Table 21 on page 39 details capital cost in the U.S., United Kingdom, and West
Germany for equipment and machinery with a physical life of 20 years [Ref. 28: p. 16].
Lower capital costs gave European shipbuilders a greater incentive to bor-
row money to finance more modern plant and equipment. European shipbuilders did
not enjoy the fixed cost advantage of several million gross ton throughput experienced
by Japanese shipbuilders during the 1980's. In fact, by virtue of their higher relative
total ship cost, particularly during the era of declining new building prices in the early
1980's, some European builders' output was rocked to a small fraction of a more pro-
38
Table 21. COST OF CAPITAL (1981-1988) FOR EQUIPMENT AND MA-
CHINERY WITH A LIFE OF 20 YEARS IN U.S., U.K. AND WEST
Year U.S. United Kingdom West Germany
1981 13.5 10.3 8.8
1982 11.5 10.7 7.8
1983 10.6 10.8 7.0
1984 11.3 9.3 7.2
1985 11.1 9.4 7.1
1986 9.1 7.8 6.9
1987 10.2 8.2 7.0
1988 11.2 9.2 7.0
ductive past. Table 22 on page 39 illustrates this phenomenon [Ref. 3: p. 3, Ref. 23: pp.
76-77, Ref. 24: pp. 28-60, Ref. 25: pp. 1-2, and Ref. 26: pp. 1-2].
Table 22. GROSS TONS PRODUCED BY THREE NORTHERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES (1981-1989)
Year Belgium Netherlands Norway
1981 223,021 172,964 310,164
1982 260,416 212,186 347,463
1983 118,183 231,758 182,036
1984 178,138 134,265 93,081
1985 124,506 72,707 78,704
1986 99,176 193,363 88,315
1987 14,336 59,300 62,264
1988 54,767 59,232 52,589
1989 39,438 88,814 32,710
While not all European shipbuilders suffered to the extent depicted in
Table 22, most lost significant gross tonnage during the 1980's. (Appendix E contains
total ship production output in GT for all twelve countries listed in the quantitative
portion of this study. Korean output is also included.) As a consequence, the econo-
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mies of scale inherent in large operations were responsible for the higher fixed and vari-
able overhead figures seen in Europe during the late 1980's.
It is interesting to note that despite the higher wages earned in Northern
Eurnpe, IT.S. shipyar,' workers still accrue more costly medical benefits. These benefits
appear as an indirect cost charged against variable overhead. Carson and Lamb [Ref.
7: pp. 8-91 estimate that the advantage of less costly medical benefits for German
shipyard workers amount to S2.55 per direct labor hour over U.S. shipyard workers.
3. United States
Labor cost rose moderate!y in the U.S. during the 1980's. Material costs de-
clined 2.8 percent form 42.8 percent to 40 percent and total overhead costs as a per-
centage of total costs remained roughly the same throughout the decade. A decline of
4.6 percent in fixed overhead costs was offset by a rise of 4.0 percent in variable over-
head costs. While no segment of the overall cost structure displayed dramatic change
during the 1980's, the vast differences in total cost evident between Japan and Europe
during 1981 shown in Table 7 on page 15 had diminished greatly by 1989.
Figur, 9 displays the impact of yen to dollar currency conversion during the
1980's with respect to the total cost structure of U.S. and Japanese shipbuilders. It is
perhaps not surprising that when the yen to dollar ratio is high (as occurred during the
period 1981 through 1985) that Japanese costs are relatively low when compared to U.S.
costs and that, consequently, when the yen to dollar ratio was low (as oc,..rred from
1986 through 1989) that Japanese costs grew relative to U.S. costs.
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Figure 9. Relative Cost Structures in U.S. and Japan vs Number of Yen per Dollar
(1981-!Q89)
Figure 10 illustrates the impact of deutschemark-to-dollar currency conversion
during the 1980's in relation to the total cost structure of U.S. and Northern European
shipbuilders. Northern European costs are low relative to U.S. costs when the
deutschemark-to-dollar ratio is high and Northern Europe costs grow relative to U.S.
costs when the deutschemark to dollar ratio is low. Therefore, it is illusory to presume
that because the gap between Japanese and Northern European shipbuilders and U.S.
shipbuilders has narrowed that U.S. shipbuilders are necessarily becoming more cost ef-
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Figure I10. Relative Cost Structures in U.S. and Northern Europe vs Deutschemark
per Dollar ( 198!- 1989)
a. U.S. Labor Costs
Most of the rise in U'.S. labor costs can be explained by wages which rose
from S12.29 per hour in 1981 to a high of S14.77 per hour in 1989. Wages fell slightly
from 1986 until 1988 when they reached a level ofS!4.33 per hour. Figure II illustrates
the relationship between labor cost and wages. a he workers currently earn less
than their Japanese and Northern European counterparts, it is interesting to note that
U.S. wages were more than twice as high as those of the world's second largest
shipbuilder, Korea. Korean shipyard workers in 1989 earned only S6.35 per hour.
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Figure !1. U.S. Labor Cost vs U.S. Wages (1981-1989)
b. U.S. Material Costs
Material costs as a percentage of the total fell during the 1980's, but the
decline was not nearly so dramatic as those experienced in Japan or Northern Europe.
U.S. steel prices reached their peak during 1983 at S517.09 per metric ton. Prices
bottomed out at S387.08 per metric ton in 1987, but rebounded smartly during 1988 and
1989. The U.S. steel price in 1989 was S478 per metric ton. Figure 12 displays the re-
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Figure 12. U.S. Material Cost vs U.S. Steel Price (1981-1989)
c. U.S. Overhead Costs
Fixed overhead costs declined modestly in the U.S. during the 1980's. De-
spite dismal commer-ial newbuilding throughput and disadvantageous borrowing rates
for new capital, this phenomenon might best be explained by the shrinking number of
private U.S. yards engaged in shipbuilding.
In 1980 the Maritime Administration MARAD listed 25 shipyards in the active
privately owned shipbuilding base. By 1988, tUis number had dropped to 19, and
events in 1989 will see this number drop further to 10 yards actively engaged in ship
construction (Ref. 7: p. 291.
Variable overhead costs climbed from 20 percent of the total in 1981 to 24
percent of the total in 1989. As mentioned previously, U.S. yards suffer a distinct dis-
advantage with respect to costly worker medical benefits which are counted as indirect
burdened labor manhours and are included as variable cost.
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C. PRODUCTIVITY
At this point, having reviewed the cost structures of Japan, Europe and the United
States separately both in local and relative terms, it is appropriate to discuss the results
of the productivity analysis detailed in Chapter III.
1. Data Organization
In this section, data will be organized into comparisons between Japan, Europe
and the United States. Comparison will also be made between Northern European and
Southern European shipbuilders. Northern European shipbuilders include Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, The Netherlands and Norway. These
countries are characterized by high wages relative to their Southern European counter-
parts. Southern European shipbuilders include Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Despite its geographical location, the United Kingdom has been included in this cate-
gory because its labor force, like those of Italy and Spain, earns relatively less than its
Northern European counterparts. The Carson and Lamb study [Ref. 7: p. 21] also cat-
egorizes the United Kingdom with Southern European shipbuilders. For tables, figures
and narrative, the word "Europe" refers to all 10 European countries cited above.
It is hoped that by using averages with respect to European productivity data,
that anomalies present within individual countries will be minimized for the entire area.
The productivity results for each individual country are included in Appendix F.
2. Labor Productivity
Labor productivity as described in this study is measured in manhours per ship.
The fewer the manhours required for ship construction, the more productive the
shipbuilding nation or area. Table 23 on page 46 and Figure 13 show the results of the
manhour comparison between Japan, Europe and the United States during the 1980's.
Several interesting observations can be made from a review of this data.
In 1981, Japanese shipbuilders expended 756,265 manhours to construct a ship
in which European shipbuilders expended 907,441 hours to build and U.S. shipbuilding
expended 1,350,966 to build. Therefore, U.S. shipbuilders during this timeframe were
only 56 percent as productive as their Japanese counterparts. This result approximates
the A.P. Appledore study cited in the Office of Technology Assessment study [Ref. 6:
p. 1091 and frequently mentioned in shipbuilding literature as a principal reason for the
decline of the U.S. shipbuilding industry. During this period, U.S. shipbuilders were only
83 percent as productive as European shipbuilders.
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Table 23. PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISON BETWEEN JAPAN, EUROPE,
AND U.S. IN MANHOURS PER SHIP (1981-1989)
Year Japan Europe United States
1981 756,265 907,442 1,350,967
1982 846,300 897,855 1,012,206
1983 973,963 1,131,734 1,084,231
1984 1,178,194 1,406,850 1,170,578
1985 1,415,975 1,631,173 1,322,601
1986 973,527 1,321,635 1,144,731
1987 859,034 1,166,016 1,100,286
1988 830,774 1,372,205 1,243,404
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Figure 13. Labor Productivity Comparison Between Japan, Europe, and the U.S. in
Manhours (1981-1989)
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By the end of the decade, Japanese shipbuilders were expending 777,980
manhours per ship, Europeans were expending 1,420,256 manhours per ship, and U.S.
shipbuilders were expending 1,160,886 manhours per ship. U.S. shipbuilders had become
67 percent as productive as their Japanese counterparts and had eclipsed Europe by a
fairly wide margin. One reason for the overall increase in total manhours per ship ex-
perienced in Japan and Europe, is the increasing complexity of the ships being built. A
similar comparison including only Northern European shipbuilders in the labor analysis
with Japan and the U.S, as shown in Figure 14, revealed that U.S. shipbuilders expended
fewer hours per ship that did Northern European builders from 1984 through 1986, but
expended more hours per ship from 1986 through 1988. In 1989, Northern European
manhours per ship exceeded U.S. manhours per ship by a narrow margin.
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A contrast of Northern and Southern European labor productivity during the
1980's can be seen in Figure 15. The principal factor driving higher manhours per ship
in the Southern European sector is the lower wages earned by workers in these countries.
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This would seem to be indicative of shipbuilding operations which are more labor in-
tensive and less automated than those prevalent in Northern Europe, Japan or the U.S.
An obvious anomaly present in Table 23 on page 46 and Figure 13, is that U.S.
labor productivity seemingly exceeded that of Japan during the middle portion of the
1980's. However, before concluding that U.S. labor enjoyed a temporary advantage over
Japanese labor during this period, one deficiency of the model itself needs to be consid-
ered. Japan enjoyed its highest output years of the decade during 1984 and 1985 when
it produced 8,972,974 GT in 1984 and 8,763,957 GT in 1985 as shown in Table 19 on
page 33. During 1985, the percentage of total local cost expended on labor in Japan
was 35.2 percent as shown in Table 15 which was a high point for that country during
the decade. A reasonable assumption can be made that labor overtime was used to
satisfy customer delivery schedule commitments. While high local cost percentage data
is captured to account for the additional costs in the numerator of equation (3.3) in
Chapter III, the denominator in the model reflects a primarily regular wage rate per
hour. This would tend to artificially inflate the number of manhours utilized in ship
construction when extensive o% ertime wage rates were paid.
To summarize, while Japan continues to enjoy significant labor productivity
advantages over its competitors, U.S shipyard labor productivity now exceeds that of




2- 2. 2,000 """
1,800 0. 1
see'
1981 1982 1983 1984 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989
Figure 15. Labor Productivity Comparison Between Northern Europe, Southern
Europe and the U.S. in Manhours (1981-1989)
Learning curve/experience curve benefits which accrued from the production of
in excess of 63,000,000 GT of shipping during the 1980's, as shown in Table 19 on page
33, undoubtedly gave Japanese yards a distinct advantage.
The "process lane system", used by Japanese shipyards in the 1980's, categorizes
all the processes into groups consisting of those with similar work content and allocates
them to specified areas in the yard. The purpose of the system is to guarantee stable
product quality and to improve productivity by fixing the workers in specified areas [Ref
27: p. 1081. This method in effect moves the work to the worker and eliminates time
wasted in alternative shipbiilding methods in which workers move from job to job in
different areas of the shipyard. It also produces workers with specialized skills and en-
courages more active supervisory attention and better span of control than do other
shipbuilding schemes.
Japanese shipyards also use "zone outfitting" methods in newbuilding which
consists of "block outfitting, fitting packages and on board outfitting. The purpose of
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this method is to execute outfitting in an environment with more ease and safety to
workers" [Ref. 27: p. 108]. In this scheme the movement of workers and materials in
minimized. Work is completed by zone which eliminates the waste of time entailed in
shifting workers to assignments in different areas.
Incorporation of design features which minimize labor manhours provided another
advantage. Design engineers in Japan do not merely produce drawings for
shipbuilding, but are expected to incorporate designs which facilitate cost reduction
and can be easily executed by workers [Ref. 27: p. 1091.
The reduction of total material quantities and categories led to the reduction of
production manhours in Japan [Ref. 27: p. 107]. Japanese workers wasted less time
looking for the right materials or tools necessary to perform their work assignments.
Improvements in industrial automation have been incorporated by Japanese yards.
"Advanced carbon dioxide semi-automatic welding machines now dominate"
[Ref. 27: p. 111]. Seventy percent of the welding at one Japanese yard (IHI) is now
performed in an automated fashion by these machines [Ref. 27: p. 11]. Japanese yards
have also mitnmated tho burning procc.,s. Incorporation of "electro-photo marking
(EPM) numerical control (N/C) gas burning machines and plasma burning machines
resulted in greater speed and accuracy in the burning process" [Ref 27: p. 111].
Improvements in the work environment have also helped the Japanese gain a
manhour productivity advantage. Some examples follow:
1. All zone outfitting areas in one yard have been weather proofed to shield workers
from the elements [Ref. 27: p. 111].
2. Simplified scaffolding has been designed to reduce set up and break down time in
one Japanese yard [Ref. 27: p. 1111.
3. Even hand tool improvements have contributed to productivity enhancements.
Where possible, lighter and quieter tools have been substituted for heavier, noisier
ones to ease the workers' daily burden [Ref 27: p. III].
4. In the organizational area, IHI cites a specific "target achievement" goal oriented
process and smaller work groups as contributors to increased labor productivity
[Ref. 27: p. 112].
It is perhaps not surprising that the one U.S. shipyard with any substantial
orderbook as shown in Table 4, Avondale Industries, in New Orleans, Louisiana has
worked closely with Japanese consultants from IHI through the Naval Shipbuilding
Research Program (NSRP) to improve its shipbuilding process.
It should also be emphasized that the apparent U.S. labor productivity advan-
tage over European shipbuilders is based strictly on cost structure and wage data. As
so
previously emphasized in Chapter II, the U.S. output of commercial gross tonnage is
very small compared to European nations like Germany, Denmark and Spain. U.S.
wage data is based on an industry primarily engaged in military rather than commercial
shipbuilding. A fairer statement about the comparison between European and U.S.
shipbuilders might be that if U.S. shipbuilders were more actively engaged in commercial
shipbuilding, they would enjoy a labor productivity advantage.
3. Material Productivity
Material productivity as described in this study is measured in metric tons of
steel per ship. The fewer metric tons of steel required for ship construction, the more
productive the shipbuilding nation or area. Table 24 and Figure 16 show the results of
material productivity comparison between Japan, U.S., Northern Europe and Southern
Europe. Some interesting observations can be made from a review of this data.
Table 24. PRODUCTIVITY COMPARISON BETWEEN JAPAN, NORTHERN
EUROPE, SOUTHERN EUROPE, AND U.S. IN METRIC TONS OF
STEEL PER SHIP (1981-1989)
Year Japan Northern Southern United StatesYearJapanEurope Europe
1981 62,305 80,663 69,322 74,346
1982 52,374 53,432 50,753 56,012
1983 49,255 52,456 51,223 56,711
1984 46,015 53,193 53,236 63,753
1985 46,617 52,895 54,191 71,838
1986 42,743 43,531 42,071 76,976
1987 40,106 40,657 41,064 71,274
1988 43,049 50,215 50,578 66,022
1989 49,045 55,119 54,945 59,785
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Figure 16. Manhour Productivity Comparison for Japan, N. Europe, S. Europe, and
Bht U.S. in Metric Tcns of Steel Per Ship (1981-1989)
While Japan was clearly the leader in material productivity for most of the dec-
ade, its curve moves in the same general direction as those of Northern Europe, and
Southern Europe. There is very little difference in material productivity between
Northern and Southern European shipbuilders. The U.S. is by far the least efficient
nation with respect to material productivity, but seems to have substantially narrowed
the gap with other nations.
It appears that Japan, Northern Europe, and Southern Europe responded to the
falling newbuilding price phenomenon experienced from 1981 to 1985 by using material
more efficiently. It is also interesting to note that material productivity continued to
improve until 1987, in these three areas, fully two years after the trough in world
newbuilding prices was experienced in 1985. As indicated earlier, in Figures 4 and 7,
steel prices which rose sharply in relative terms because of a weaker dollar, as shown in
Tables 8, 9 and 10, and would seem to account for most of the improved material pro-
ductivity.
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Several explanations are offered for Japan's shipbuilding leadership positions in
material productivity. Standardization is used by Japanese shipbuilders in the categori-
zation of materials used in shipbuilding. This eliminates waste in the form of scrap re-
jected due to variation in acceptable quality standards [Ref. 27: p. 107]. Japanese
management techniques also foster long term relationships with suppliers to acquire
desired quality in materials obtained.
Just-In-Time inventory management techniques are utilized by Japanese
shipbuilders. This technique reduces inventory holding costs to an absolute minimum
since shipbuilding supplies arrive only when needed. This management method also
tends to reduce fixed overhead corts by minimizing warehouse space required to store
supplies [Ref. 27: p. 107].
Japanese shipbuilders also seemed to coordinate requirements better between
their design department and their material procurement area to minimize leadtimes in
acquiring material [Ref. 27: p. 107].
More precise control using automated welding and burning equipment would
also account for less material scrappage (Ref 27: p. 111.
Within the scope of the present methodology, much cf the disadvantage which
the U.S. suffers in material productivity is driven by the relatively high composite ship
cost and almost fiat pcrcentage of cost accounted for by material. Obstacles which the
U.S. must overcome in order to improve material productivity are discussed in the next
chapter.
4. Overhead Productivity
While little can be said quantitatively about overhead productivity because of
the difficulty described in Chapter III of selecting an appropriate unit for extracting the
data, Table 25 on page 54, Table 26 on page 54, and Table 27 on page 55, list cost
(both fixed and variable) per ship in dollars in Japan, Europe, and the United States over
time using information from Tables 14 through 17.
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Table 25. JAPANESE OVERHEAD PER SHIP IN DOLLARS: 1981-1989
Year Fixed Variable Total
1981 1,866,191 5,781,533 7,647,724
1982 1,455,595 4,508,103 5,963,698
1983 1,517,411 4,698,138 6,215,549
1984 1,587,074 4,912,371 6,499,445
1985 1,731,191 5,356,892 7,088,083
1986 2,444,258 6,145,565 8,589,823
1987 3,331,313 7,236,992 10,568,305
1988 5,116,933 9,985,472 15,102,405
.1989 6,429,835 11,412,962 17,842,797
Table 26. EITROPFAN OVERHEAD PER SHIP IN DOLLARS: 1981-1989
Year Fixed Variable Total
1981 2,572,693 8,214,568 10,787,261
1982 1,845,502 5,912,446 7,757,948
1983 1,747,463 5,653,556 7,401,019
1984 1,666,127 5,414,914 7,081,041
1985 1,633,229 5,335,214 6,968,443
1986 2,472,358 6,634,162 9,106,520
1987 3,470,448 8,347,841 11,818,289
1988 5,550,305 11,973,691 17,523,996
1989 7,132,836 14,265,673 21,398,509
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the cost structures prevalent in Japan,
Europe and the U.S., those areas with lower costs of capital and high shipyard
throughput enjoy an advantage in the realm of fixed overhead. Indirect manhours which
are considered a variable overhead cost are negatively influenced by costly worker med-
ical benefits.
Another factor pertinent to fixed overhead cost which has enabled Japan to
continue to achieve lower costs than its competitors, is capacity management as shown
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Table 27. UNITED STATES OVERHEAD PER SHIP IN DOLLARS: 1981-1989
Year Fixed Variable Total
1981 13,379,428 16,119,794 29,499,222
1982 10,395,835 13,319,665 23,715,500
1983 10,725,016 14,625,023 25,350,039
1984 11,241,186 16,330,104 27,571,290
1985 12,357,194 19,011,056 31,368,250
1986 10,135,116 16,645,267 26,780,383
1987 8,878,126 15,587,552 24,465,678
1988 9,437,500 17,742,480 27,179,980
1989 8,573,154 17,146,304 25,719,458
in Figure 17. While shipyards throughout the world closed during the 1980's, mostly in
response to low demand and low newbuilding prices, the Japanese shipbuilding industry
has apparently formulated a strategy designed to overcome the adverse productivity ef-
fect of too many underutilized shipyards. Figure 17, reproduced from Sh'pyard Weekly
[Ref. 18: p. 481, indicates that Japan, even during periods of increasing demand, has
continued to relentlessly slash yard capacity in an effort to squeeze the most productivity
from its facilities.
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Chapter IV quantitatively underscores relative labor and material productivity in
U.S. commercial shipyards. It depicts a U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry whose
labor productivity has improved but still lags that achieved by Japan. It also points out
material productivity disadvantages the U.S. suffers from when compared to Japan and
Europe. Although material productivity in U.S. yards is improving, it is worth noting
that the metric ton gap between the U.S. and its competitors, shown in Table 24 and
Figure 16, translates into millions of dollars per ship. Perhaps most significant is the fact
that much of the apparent improvement of relative U.S. ship cost is based on a dollar
which has weakened markedly since 1985.
This chapter will discuss other obstacles which the U.S. commercial shipL-iding
industry faces in meeting the competitive goals detailed in Chapter II. These obstacles
fall into three categories:
1. Fierce International Competition
2. Ineffective U.S. Government Policy
3. The American Business Environment
B. FIERCE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
Aside from the nations included in the quantitative portion of this study, there are
a host of other countries capable of producing high quality, low cost commercial ships.
This section will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of several current and potential
shipbuilding powerhouses.
1. South Korea
The world's most dramatic shipbuilding success story in the past 15 years has
been the nation of South Korea. "From 5.7% of the world market in 1975, the Korean
builders rose to 9% in 1980, 19.2% in 1983, and 30.2% ir 1987." [Rel'. 29: p. 491. As
Table I illustrates, Korean shipbuilders' rank second behind Japan in total GT
produced.
Collectively, the three major yards, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HH I), Samsung,
and Daewoo, are capable of building virtually every conceivable ship type including Very
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Large Crude Carriers (VLCC's), container ships, chemical tankers, liquid petroleum gas
(LPG) carriers, semi-submersible drilling rigs, and passenger vessels.
Despite wages which are less than half of those earned in Europe, Japan, and
the U.S., it would be erroneous to conclude that Korea owes its dominant position in
world shipbuilding to cheap labor alone. At least one yard, "Inchon Engineering utilizes
Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) in its ship de-
sign and building program", [Ref 30: p. 389]. Significant engineering expertise is also
evidenced by the fact that -Hyundai Heavy Industry (HHI) is known to be exporting a
full package of design documentation for an 88,900 DWT crude carrier to the
Portuguese yard of Setenave", [Ref. 30: p. 389]. C. Y. Lee, general manager of the
Korean Shipbuilders Association notes that "Korean shipbuilders are fully booked until
late 1992 Lnd expects that the demand to replace old tonnage will increase until at least
2000", [Ref. 31: p. 41].
The Porter and Cho study describes the nation's shipbuilding industry in the
following manner:
Korean shipbuilders are acclaimed as the most efficient in the world. Their labor
force is disciplined and works twelve hours per day. Night shifts are available if
needed. Yards seldom miss delivery schedules and in many cases significantly
shorten the normal building period from twenty four to thirty months by as much
as ten to fifteen months [Ref. 15: p. 560].
Despite considerable engineering expertise and a reputation for producing low
cost, high quality ships, Korean shipbuilders would seem to have been the victims of
their own success. By vying relentlessly with the Japanese for increased market share
during the 1980's, Korean shipyards accumulated enormous losses during the 1980's.
"At the end of 1987 total debts of the four major yards were Won 3700 billion (S5.43
billion dollars)" [Ref. 29: p. 491.
In addition, input costs to the labor process have risen dramatically. The Jenks
and Lamer study [Ref. 13: p. 13] reported steel prices at $310 per metric ton in 1981.
By 1986 Carson and Lamb [Ref 7: p. 7] report that prices had fallen to S280 per metric
ton. However, in 1989 Carson and Lamb [Ref. 7: p. 7] indicate Korean steel prices had
risen to nearly S500 per metric ton which ranks (by this author's estimate) as one of the
highest of the major shipbuilding nations in the world.
Additionally, labor costs have risen astronomically from 1981 to 1989. In 1981,
Korean workers earned (Won 1403) or S2.06 per hour. In 1989, workers earned (Won
4263) or $6.35 per hour. The big three yards, HHI, Samsung, and Daewoo, all suffered
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major strikes during 1989 and 1990 which resulted in a substantial number of lost orders
and wage concessions to laborers.
2. Peoples' Republic of China
A nation with more than a billion people would seem to have a remarkable ad-
vantage in a labor intensive industry such as shipbuilding. In fact, the Porter and Cho
study [Ref. 15: p. 562] and Carson and Lamb study [Ref. 7: p. 7] forecast that China will
become a low cost leader in shipbuilding during the 1990's.
The environment seems particularly favorable for the growth of shipbuilding in
this nation. While actual data is not available on wages per hour in China, "Labor costs
in China are known to be low" [Ref. 32: p. 51]. This translates into cheaper contract
prices. Actual newbuilding costs average 5-10 percent less in China than in Japan and
South Korea [Ref. 32: p. 51].
Additionally, the government is committed to making the shipbuilding industry
work. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) has ambitions of "turning out
high tech ships" [Ref. 32: p. 51]. In support of this vision, CSSC has some 30 research
and development centers under its jurisdiction. "The largest, the China Ship Scientific
Research Center, employs 500 engineers" to create the designs for these high tech ships
[Ref. 32: p. 51]. The Chinese government has designated six universities to graduate a
total of 3,000 shipbuilding engineers every year. This mears that there are currently
more shipbuilding engineers in China than the entire work force of approximately
"10,000 people" [Ref. 7: p. 30] dedicated to commercial shipbuilding in the U.S.
CSSC has imported technology as a method of accelerating the growth of their
shipbuilding industry.
CSSC has now procured the technology, either through license or coproduction
agreements, to produce 50 types of equipment such as engines, generators, cranes,
and hydraulic deck machinery [Ref. 32: p. 51].
Another remarkable aspect of the Chinese shipbuilding industry is the fact that
individual yards do not function merely as installers of major equipment. Yards such
as Hludong in Shanghai are vertically integrated factories which in essence convert raw
materials into ships.
It has traditionally been the policy in the Peoples' Republic of China that each en-
terprise is assigned a mission and then it is to develop itself both vertically and
horizontally to accomplish the mission...Hudong for example, builds its own en-
gines, makes its own valves and fittings and makes all of the castings and forgings
that are required. Likewise, all of the support services necessary to design and build
a ship are contained within the shipyard organization [Ref. 33: p. 255].
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Critics of Chinese shipbuilding point out several areas in which the nation suf-
fers serious disadvantages. These include:
" "Productivity levels as low as 10% of those achieved in Japan" [Ref. 34: p. 79].
* "Most shipyards with the notable exception of the nation's largest, Dalian, are lo-
cated along relatively shallow rivers constraining ability for expansion",
* "High material cost is another disadvantage. The costs of raw materials currently
accounts for approximately 70 % of the total ship cost",
" "The presence of inefficient socialist system management which accounts for fre-
quent delivery delay is cited as another weakness" [Ref. 32: p. 531.
While Chinese shipbuilders are currently devoted to the construction of a sub-
stantial domestic fleet, the export market brings in much needed foreign exchange [Ref.
32: p. 511. "The question now appears to be not so much if China will be a leading
shipbuilding power but when" [Ref 32: p. 50].
3. Former Eastern Block Countries
The fabric of the post cold-war world offers the potential for increased
shipbuilding business opportunities in the nations of Eastern Europe. Several offer
highly advanced shipbuilding capability, labor forces earning comparatively low wages,
and a desire to parlay their new found autonomy and shipbuilding export experience into
money making ventures. Indeed, four of the top 20 entries from Table 1, Merchant
Ships Completed During 1989, are countries formerly aligned closely with the USSR:
Yugoslavia, Romania, German Democratic Republic, and Poland.
a. Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia currently ranks as the world's third largest shipbuilder. "About
95% of the orders placed in Yugoslavia are for export" [Ref. 35: p. 171. Yugoslavia has
long been a builder of ships for the Soviet Union and this is not likely to change with
the new world order.
Recently Soviet shipping delegates visited the big yards for talks on the next five
year shipbuilding plan and while nobody was willing to comment in depth on the
outcome of the talks, it is widely accepted that the Soviets are turning their attention
to the construction of cruise vessels to replace an aging passenger fleet [Ref. 35: pp.
17-18].
Despite a formidable shipbuilding industry, Yugoslavia faces severe eco-
nonic problems. Inflation during 1986 reached a staggering 2600 percent [Ref. 36: p.
14]. Additionally, the three major shipyards, Uljanik, Split, and Treci Maj, who employ
approximately 7000 workers, each realize that the work force needs to be reduced in
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order to remain competitive [Ref. 36: p. 14]. One yard is trying to couple a sense of so-
cial consciousness with business acumen in handling the industry wide layoffs. Lenac,
a mid-sized yard, has offered laid-off workers an opportunity to compete as sub-
contractors. The only stipulation is that the yard keep a majority stake in the operation
of these new found companies. Lenac hopes to reduce its subcontracting costs and keep
former employees under the yard umbrella by implementing this strategy [Ref. 37: p. 19].
b. Romania
While little information was readily available about this nation, Romania
ranked 9th in gross tonnage completed during 1989. The yards hold an orderbook of
some 585,204 DWT for their domestic fleet and export customers, such as the USSR,
Cuba, and China. The major yards in Romania are Braila, Constantza, Galatz,
Mangalia, and Turnu [Ref. 4: pp. vii, 25- 26].
c. German Democratic Republic
The fall of the Berlin Wall has some interesting implications for the world
shipbuilding community. Table 28 indicates that if the gross tonnage output of East
and West Germany were totalled for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989, a unified Germany
would have comfortably been the third largest producer in the world behind Japan and
Korea [Ref. 3: p. 3; Ref. 25: pp. 1-2; and Ref. 26: pp. 1-2].
Table 28. OUTPUT OF WEST GERMANY (FRG) AND EAST GERMANY
(GDR) IN GT: 1987-199
I YEAR FRG GDR TOTAL
1987 341,319 292,241 633,560
1988 521,156 292,221 813,377
1989 430,849 287,185 718,034
Regardless of the form that restructuring takes in the shipyards of a new
unified Germany, this nation will be a powerful force in the world shipbuilding scene of
the future. One particularly advantageous aspect of the unification is that the new na-
tion can draw upon established export customer pools in both Eastern and Western
Europe.
d. Poland
Poland possesses a long-standing reputation as a nation that builds quality
export tonnage. Polish shipyards are capable of building virtually all modern commer-
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cial ship types including containers, reefers, passenger vessels, and crude oil carriers.
Their current orderbook contains 63 ships totalling 1,441,580 DWT [Ref. 4: p. vii]. The
largest customer, by far, of the Polish yards is the Soviet Union. However, Poland is
also contracted to manufacture ships for Norway, France, West Germany, Finland,
India, and Czechoslovakia [Ref. 4: pp. 24-251, The appearance of the names of several
prominent Northern European shipbuilding nations in the Polish orderbook makes a
strong statement about the quality and cost of ships being built in Poland. The largest
Polish shipyards are Szczecin, Pary, Gdanska, Polnocna, and Remontowa [Ref. 4: pp.
24-251.
e. Eastern European Summary
The impressive commercial shipbuilding credentials possessed by the East-
em European shipbuilders have not gone unnoticed by other global competitors.
A Japanese delegation comprising members of the country's shipbuilding sector has
embarked on a fact finding mission to eastern Europe. Included in the numbers are
top officials from the Shipbuilding Committee of the Council for Rationalization of
Shipping and Shipbuilding Industries, the Shipbuilders' Association of Japan (SAJ),
and a major Japanese shipbuilder, Mitsui Engineering and Shipbuilding Company.
A spokesman for the delegation commented, "It is hoped to improve the level of
international co-operations between Japan and the chief shipbuilding nations of
eastern Europe, Poland, Germany, and Yugoslavia" [Ref 38: p. 7].
This author speculates that Japan, faced with rising labor and material costs
domestically, is anxious to export its advanced technology to low labor cost areas per-
haps in some manner of "transplant- arrangement similar to those entered into with the
American automobile industry.
4. Brazil
Outside the eastern block, one shipbuilding nation with a healthy orderbook and
rather unique financing mechanism is the South American nation of Brazil. Brazil cur-
rently possesses the world's third largest orderbook totalling 3,595,005 DWT [Ref. 4: p.
vii]. The vast preponderance of orders at the major yards, East Caneco, Ishibras, and
Verolme, are for expansion of a growing domestic fleet which export everything from
lumber to oranges [Ref. 4: p. 14] and [Ref. 39: p. 17].
Brazil has hopes of converting some of its international debt burden into ship
exports [Ref. 40: p. 7]. The elaborate financing scheme which emables Brazil to offer
competitive pricing, direct business to its yards, and reduce its debt is described below:
In the hypothetical case of a Brazilian ship selling for S75 million and costing 50%
more than a comparable South Korean bottom, buyer and yard would negotiate
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specifications and delivery time of the ship to be built and exported. Contract in
hand, the buyer would purchase Brazilian debt certificates worth S98 million from
a creditor bank. Since the Brazilian paper sells for 50% off face value the buyer
actually receives a price SI million less than the South Korean price. Presented with
the certificates, the central bank would wipe S98 million from its international debt
and authorize the release of S75 million worth of cruzados to the shipyard, a 23.5%
discount from the face value of the converted certificates [Ref. 40: p. 51.
-Brazilian yards have a good record on quality and can build more than simple ship
types' [Ref. 41: p. 261.
It is also worth mentioning that U.S. owner Chevron is purchasing three,
150,000 DWT crude oil carriers from the Ishibras shipyard in Rio de Janiero for delivery
in 1991 [Ref. 4: p. 14].
Brazil stands to gain from the fact that interested Scandinavian owners are being
turned --way frcm Asian shipyards who are booked to capacity through 1992 [Ref. 41:
p. 26].
5. Competitive Summary
It is against these formidable competitors that the U.S. commercial shipbuilding
industry has hopes of re-emergence. The outlook for successful recovery is doubtful.
The next two sections will discuss other obstacles the U.S. commercial shipbuilding in-
dustry must overcome.
C. INEFFECTIVE U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY
I. Background: No Long Term U.S. Strategy
One of the principal impediments to a reinvigorated industry in the United
States continues to be the absence of a cohesive long term government strategy which
encourages commercial shipbuilding. As mentioned previously in Chapter II, it is im-
portant to remember that while free trade is a noble goal, virtually all international
shipbuilders, with the exception of those in the U.S., receive some sort of governmental
support.
The very nature of the industry requires commitment as a long term player to
be successful. "If there is one lesson to learnt from the past it is that hard times are the
norm in commercial shipbuilding" [Ref. 42: p. 41]. Shipbuilding is characterized by
boom and bust cycles. It is an industry in which the financial resources involved in ex-
pensive waterside facilities, heavy plant and equipment and construction cost are enor-
mous. It is a business in which the pricing of ships below cost is a common practice.
The reality of the international marketplace is that no private enterprise can afford to
make a go of it in commercial shipbuilding without government assistance.
63
Yet U.S. government policy with respect to commercial shipbuilding in the past
decade has essentially mandated that commercial shipyards go it alone. Public policy in
the 1980's achieved short term cost avoidance goals but lacked a vision of the longer
term consequences for the industry. For example, when the U.S government suspended
Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) in 1982 because of its onerous cost, it aban-
doned an ailing industry at a time when it most required government intervention for
survival. The cost savings achieved in the early 1980's do not seem as significant when
viewing the U.S. shipbuilding industry in its currently underwhelming world position.
John Stocker, President of the Shipbuilders Council of America, made the fol-
lowing statement before Congress, discussing foreign competition and U.S. maritime
strategy. It aptly summarizes the short-sightedness of U.S. policy in commercial
shipbuilding.
In short, I would say that one of the reasons that they are good shipyards and why
they have been successful in the commercial market, is because their governments
have an industrial strategy in regard to shipbuilding, where we have not had such
strategy here in the United States [Ref. 5: p. 48].
Some of the consequences of government policy as they relate to future obsta-
cles to U.S. commercial shipbuilding are discussed below. Most illustrate how short
term considerations prevailed over long term implications in the policy making process.
2. Lack of Healthy Commercial and Military Mix
One of the few safety nets for U.S. shipbuilders in the 1980's was the Reagan
Administration mandate to build the 600 ship Navy. A failure of long range strategy (as
seen from the hindsight of a 1990 perspective) is that government neglected to provide
for an adequate mix between commercial and military vessels. Shaped by the dollars
from the Shipbuilding Construction Navy (SCN) appropriation, U.S. shipyards became
almost exclusively the builders of high technology military warships.
It is interesting to note that S31.3 billion, or greater than 95% of the dollars in
the collective newbuilding U.S. shipyard orderbook is for U.S Navy vessels [Ref. 43: p.
44]. If U.S. Army and U.S Coast Guard vessels are included, the total percentage of
dollars, being spent on military vessels in the U.S. orderbook rises to 97.5 percent [Ref.
43: p. 44].
The departure from the commercial sector of the market enabled competitors in
other nations to gain increased advantage in terms of market share and efficiency. It
also enabled foreign nations to leapfrog ahead of the U.S. in commercial technology and
design development.
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Perhaps the most important factor in the neglect of the commercial shipbuilding
sector is that U.S. shipbuilders are ill-equipped to transition to a more commerce-
oriented and commercially competitive post cold war world. It is indeed ironic that the
massive emphasis on military vessel construction which at least in part resulted in
bringing the cold war to an end, has to some degree relegated the commercial
shipbuilding sector to virtually non-entity status. Equally ironic is the fact that U.S.
yards are prevented by Department of Defense Policy from exporting that which they
make best, warships [Ref. 44: p. 91.
3. Failure to Recognize Impact on the Industrial Base.
Another dramatic consequence of both a government policy of neglect and a
down market for commercial tonnage in general during the 1980's has been the signif-
icant reduction of the shipbuilding industrial base.
In early 1984, the U.S. Navy and the Maritime Administration issued a joint classi-
fied report which examined the ability of the private shipbuilding and ship repair
sectors to contribute to a national mobilization base. In 1982, the Shipyard
Mobilization Base Analysis (SYMBA) study identified 110 private shipyards as es-
sential to the nations's mobilization requirements. 43 of those 110 SYMBA yards
have closed leaving only 67 yards or 60.9 in operation today [Ref. 5: p. 52].
An even grimmer scenario is represented by industries which support
shipbuilding in this country.
As bad as the shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base may be, the national
infrastructure of manufacturing firms supplying components which are integral parts
of both commercial and naval ships may be in worse condition. Across the broad
spectrum of machinery including turbines, diesel engines, gears, valves, castings, and
forging, delivery lead times are increasing and the number of companies bidding on
such work is rapidly decreasing [Ref. 5: p. 551.
4. Lack of Commitment to Research
Another obstacle to progress in U.S. commercial shipbuilding has been the U.S
government's sporadic support of the shipbuilding research effort. An extremely capable
organization which seemed to be making impressive headway on formulating solutions
to shipbuilding productivity problems in the early 1980's was the National Shipbuilding
Research Program (NSRP). This organization dedicated itself to attacking virtually all
aspects of the U.S. shipbuilding productivity problem. Its panel format pursued better
modes ot operation in a number of diverse areas including facilities utilization, welding,
human resource innovation, and industrial engineering to name only a few.
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However, federal budget cutting measures largely eliminated funding for the NSRP
in 1984, and the transfer of the NSRP to the U.S. Navy has only recently restored
funds to the program [Ref. 7: p. 131.
Germany, Japan, Norway, and Korea all boast government sponsored programs
which are actively engaged in the design aspect of future ships. These nations are tack-
ling such diverse innovations as manpower reduction in ship operation; shared computer
aided design and computer aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) in the production process;
and greater automation in ship operation [Ref. 7: p. 12]. The United States cannot point
to similar government commitment on its part for commercial shipbuilding research.
5. The Deficit
Looming like a dark cloud over any remote prospect of commercial shipbuilding
recovery in the United States is the massive federal budget deficit. Volumes of analytical
literature continue to be written on the size, scope, and reasons for the U.S. federal
budget deficit. The battle for government funds grows increasingly more intense each
year. Commercial shipbuilders seeking government assistance can count on very tough
struggles to obtain badly needed financing.
One recent example highlights the conflict between Congress and the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) related to the deficit. It illustrates how long term priorities can
be obscured by economic reality. This example is particularly relevant since it deals with
the future well being of U.S. shipbuilders.
A portion of the sealift budget (S217.2 million) was reprogrammed to help pay for
the defense account shortfalls resulting from an earlier move by the Administration
to avoid cuts stemming from Gramm-Rudman budget requirements. This means
that S347.8 million remains for sealift out of almost $600 million originally appro-
priated by Congress in the FY 1990 budget. That the Fast Sealift program has
survived at all is a tribute to Congress, despite continued attempts by DOD to kill
it [Ref 45: p. l.
Another distressing implication for U.S shipbuilders which the deficit and a
changing political environment portends, is a reduction of military newbuildings. Since
the 600 ship Navy concept has fallen from favor and the cold war has ended, American
yards will almost certainly be facing not only a reduction in their newbuilding growth
rate, but also the outright cancellation of currently-projected orders for military ships in
future years.
D. AMERICAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
American corporate goals and management practices also constitute a formidable
obstacle to a resurgence of the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry. This section will
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discuss several business factors which continue to prevent U.S. shipyards from becoming
more competitive.
1. Profitability
A principal objective of any American chief executive officer (CEO) must be the
profitability of the enterprise in which his company is engaged. As the reader can recall
from earlier chapters, newbuilding prices in the past decade have rarely covered costs.
Even cost efficient shipbuilders in Japan and Korea sustain huge losses. Few American
corporations can best serve their shareholders by venturing into the intensely compet-
itive, low profit world of commercial shipbuilding.
2. Short Term Outlook
An obsession with the bottom line, quarterly earnings, and dividend payments
has long dominated the American business scene. Commercial shipbuilding requires that
a corporation be a long term player to be successful. Success in commercial shipbuilding
over the past decade has meant outlasting your competitors. Commercial shipyards in
Japan provide an excellent example. Several were capable of absorbing losses for several
successive years. This tactic was employed to maintain world market share.
Competitors unable to continue to absorb losses exit the marketplace. Sweden,
the paradigm of shipbuilding excellence in the 1960's and 1970's, has now virtually
abandoned the industry.
Employment in Swedish yards has been reduced from over 30,000 in 1975 to 13,000
in December 1984. The decision was taken in December 1984 to close the Uddevalla
Yard. Despite the fact that the Swedish shipyards are considered to be the most
efficient in the world, subsidies from 1977 to 1984 had totalled S2 billion [Ref. 42:
p. 391.
Few American corporations could justify sustained losses for very long to their
shareholders with the lure of uncertain profits to be garnered a decade later.
3. Poor Customer Service Orientation
American commercial shipyards historically have been all but oblivious to the
very real concerns of American shipowners.
Shipowners are faced with their own ominous array of problems. These include
intense low cost foreign competition, high U.S. crew costs, and an ever increasing public
concern for the environment. U.S. commercial shipbuilders have merely added another
burden to the list. A recent statement by William P. Verdon, President, United
Shipowners of America illustrates this point.
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On the issue of vessel parity, we are in a unique position in that Operating Differ-
ential Subsidy (ODS)4 operators today cannot build vessels that will allow them to
compete in the world marketplace. They cannot build in the United States because
of the excess costs without ODS and they cannot build foreign because of the cur-
rent governmental regulations. Even if they had the wherewithal to build in the
United States and even if they could find a banking institution willing to finance it
on a 20-ship merchant marine company, they would be talking about a differential
of over S 1 billion.
Now, I am not specifically saying it is a billion or 5900 million. I do not
think the numbers are really important. What is important, Senator, is the re-
lationship and the ratio of the difference. If the ships cost twice as much or 1.7
times as much, that fact is either one of those cases is a sure road map to bank-
ruptcy. You just cannot do it [Ref. 5: p. 60].
While an in depth discussion of the problems of the U.S. shipowner will not be
attempted in this thesis, Mr. Verdon's statement highlights two significant points:
1. High cost U.S. commercial shipbuilding has had a very definite impact on U.S.
shipowners' desire to purchase abroad.
2. The high cost of building commercial ships in America has been a principal reason
government legislators have continued to embrace proteotionist legislation and re-
fused to repeal the 1920 Jones Act. This act mandates that U.S. ships engaged in
trade between U.S. ports be built in the United States.
4. Shipbuilding Technique
Shipbuildin, technique repre-sents another obstacle to U.S. competitiveness.
Volumes have been written about the differences between shipbuilding production
methods in the U.S. and those prevalent in Japan. However, in comparing the per-
formance of a U.S. yard, Avondale, to a Japanese yard, Kawasaki Heavy Industries
(KHI), Dr. Howard Bunch from NSRP made the following succinct observation:
The U.S. yard's poorest comparative performance is in the category of design-
engineering-planning-mold loft. The difference is traceable to the standardization
and modularization that permit a large portion of the design and engineering activ-
ities to be essentially the retrieval of the documentation from files [Ref. 46: p. 341.
Interestingly enough, Bunch indicates that the U.S. does not suffer a disadvan-
tage with respect to incorporating computer technology into the design process, as the
OTA study [Ref. 6: p. 991. would seem to indicate.
Another example is the extent of integration of CAD/CAM being introduced into
the production environment; Avondale was further advanced in this area than was
Kill, Kobe [Ref. 46: p. 341.
4 ODS is a direct subsidy paid to U.S. flag operators to offset the high operating costs of U.S.
flag ships when compared to foreign flag counterparts IRef. 6: p. 2231.
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This thesis will not attempt to enumerate all areas in which U.S. shipbuilding
technique is deficient. Chapter IV, Section B, (I.c.), offers a fair synopsis of shipbuilding
techniques which Japap has employed to reduce overhead costs. U.S. shipbuilders are
currently attempting to emulate many of these successful production methods.
5. Leadtime Management
The difficulty entailed in rapidly receiving components from suppliers is seen as
another impediment to U.S. commercial shipbuilding competitiveness. Long leadtimes
from suppliers have been a principal cause for the lengthy construction time required in
American yards. In a recent article [Ref. 33: p. 255-257], Dr. Bunch describes the impact
on the ship construction process of lengthy leadtimes. He compares a U.S yard
(Avondale) to a Chinese yard (Hudong).
In Red China, materials acquired within the Chinese domestic system either raw
materials or finished goods are ordered at specified times during the year. The typ-
ical order months for shipyards are February and August; at those times purchasing
agents indicate to a central organization their material needs for the next 6-12
months into the future. These requests are then forwarded to the specified supplier,
or to a supplier of the central organization's choice if it is deemed necessary to make
the supplier change [Ref. 33: p. 255].
Interestingly enough, Chinese shipyard procurement leadtimes are shorter than
those in the U.S. even given the constraints imposed by an awkward, centrally con-
trolled, system. "In only one instance, the electric generator, is the Hudong lead time
period greater than that at Avondale" [Ref. 33: p. 256].
The reader is cautioned that while the inventory holding costs which accompany
the shorter Chinese leadtimes are not considered, this example does make a statement
about the level of customer service offered by American suppliers and the white collar
support provided by American shipyard procurement departments.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has attempted to examine the size and underlying reasons for produc-
tivity deficiencies in U.S. commercial shipbuilding.
Chapter II provided background information on the current status of the U.S.
commercial shipbuilding industry with respect to other international shipbuilding na-
tions. It depicts an industry which has reached its low point in the history of this nation.
Chapter III outlined the methodology to be used for productivity measurement.
Four international shipbuilding studies [Ref. 7: pp. 1-32; Ref. 13: pp. 1-20; Ref. 14: pp.
44-66; and Ref. 15: pp. 539-567], were used extensively to make assumptions about cost
structures prevalent in the U.S., Japan and Northern Europe during the 1980's. Wage
data, gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics [Ref. 9: pp. 1-3 and Ref. 12: pp. 1-18]
was used to extract labor productivity information measured in manhours worked per
ship in the three respective areas. Similarly, steel prices obtaincd from the Metal Bulletin
Handbook [Ref. 10: pp. 157-241 and Ref. 11: pp. 183-240] were used to extract material
productivity information measured in metric tons of steel used per ship.
Chapter IV detailed the results of this analysis. It depicted U.S. labor productivity
as exceeding that present in Europe but lagging far behind that prevalent in Japan. This
analysis also revealed a U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry which suffers distinct
disadvantages with respect to material and overhead productivity. Additionally, this
chapter discussed at length how much of the apparent U.S. improvement in labor and
material productivity can be explained by a U.S. dollar which decreased markedly
against other international currencies.
Chapter V discussed in detail three formidable obstacles which continue to thwart
U.S. competitive goals. The three obstacles described are fierce international competi-
tion, ineffective U.S. government policy, and the American business environment. A
synopsis of important world commercial shipbuilders not discussed in the quantitative
portion of this thesis was included in this chapter. Government policies qeen as most
detrimental to U.S. commercial shipbuilding were listed as:
" An absence of long ter., strategy
" A failure to promote a healthy mix of commercial and military ship construction
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" A failure to recognize the impact that the absence of commercial shipbuilding has
had on the U.S. industrial base
" A lack of commitment to research
" The federal budget deficit
Factors prevalent in the business sector seen as incompatible with a resurgence of
the commercial shipbuilding sector were viewed to be:
" The absence of profitability to attract investors to U.S. commercial shipbuilding
" A short term corporate outlook
" Poor customer service orientation
" Inefficient shipbuilding technique
" Ineffective leadtime management
B. CONCLUSIONS
The central concluzion of this thesis is that the U.S. commercial shipbuilding in-
dustry continues to face significant productivity problems with respect to its interna-
tional competitors.
While U.S. hourly wage rates are approximately equal to those earned in Japan,
U.S. labor productivity is markedly lower. The U.S. does, however, enjoy a slight labor
productivity advantage over Northern European shipbuilders. The labor productivity
advantage enjoyed over Northern European shipbuilders, however, seems less significant
when considering that a number of low cost, technologically advanced shipbuilders, such
as China, Korea, Brazil, and several eastern European nations seemed poised to flex
their industrial muscle upon the international shipbuilding scene.
Material productivity in the United States, while improving, lags behind that
achieved in Japan and Europe by a significant margin. Efficient shipbuilding practices
such as design and material use standardization, zone outfitting, process lane operation,
and ju-in-time inventory management have been key ingredients in making Japan the
world leader with respect to material productivity.
U.S. overhead productivity suffers for two principal reasons:
1. The high cost of capital tends to discourage long term investment in plant and
equipment. This failure to keep pace with the latest forms of industrial technology
continues to have an adverse effect on labor and material productivity.
2. The small U.S. orderbook makes it extremely difficult for U.S. commercial
shipbuilders to take advantage of the economies of scale which accrue with larger
serial production operation.
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A second, perhaps more inmportant conclusion, is that U.S. commercial shipbuilders
face a tough, uphill battle for survival. Stiff competition from abroad will continue to
be a chief obstacle. A U.S. government policy with no long term strategy and an enor-
mous deficit have not proved helpful to the industry. Corporate investors are likely to
steer clear of commercial shipbuilding in this country until productivity and profitability
improve.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Several options can be pursued to assist U.S. commercial shipbuilders to achieve the
competitive goals defined in Chapter III. These are:
1. Transplant Shipyards
U.S. and Japanese cooperation has been employed in other industries to the
advantage of both partners. The automotive industry offers several such examples.
There are currently eight transplant automobile factories in the U.S. Toyota which
builds some of its Corolla subcompacts at its joint venture factory with GM in Fremont,
California, plans to build a second plant in the U.S. sometime in the near future [Ref.
47: pp. A3 and A6].
Shipbuilding seems ideally suited to a transplant arrangement. Japar. offers a
wealth of capital, experience, and management expertise and could anticipate profits in
excess of those which U.S. shipbuilders are capable of earning by virtue of their more
efficient shipbuilding technique. The U.S. offers adequate facilities and an increasingly
productive workforce. The aging U.S. flag fleet would profit by obtaining sorf- needed
replacement tonnage at lower cost. U.S. shipping consumers would also benefit by the
achievement of lower cost.
Some groundwork has already been laid for such an endeavor. Scholars from
the National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) have worked with Japanese
shipbuilders for more than a decade on efforts to import Japanese shipbuilding expertise
and incorporate it into the U.S. shipbuilding process [Ref. 27: pp. 104-1141.
A recent comment by John Stocker, President of the Shipbuilders' Council of
America, indicates that foreign interest in U.S. shipyards is not just a theoretical pro-
position.
I have had foreign shipyard executives who are interested in potential joint ventures
with U.S. yards come to me and say one ofthe reasons they are interested is because
of thc fact that the United Srtes foes offer, by comparison to their own ountrics,
low labor cost, and I think i-hit is a fairly fundanicntal shift that is not well-
re,ognized here in Washington [Ref. 5: p. 491.
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2. Greater Military Involvement in Commercial Shipbuilding
With a S288.3 billion dollar budget authorization for 1991 [Ref. 48: p. 11, DOD
would appear to be a deep-pocketed alternative for financing a resurgence of commercial
shipbuilding in this country. The Navy s current domination of the shipbuilding
orderbook as well as the importance of the shipbuilding industrial base to the Navy
provide additional rationales for linking commercial and military shipbuilding.
Perhaps the most significant argument in favor of greater military involvement
in commercial shipbuilding is DOD's notably deficient military sealift capability. Recent
experience related to Operation Desert Shield underscores this point.
Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, Commander of the Military Sealift Command
(MSC) told the House Merchant Marine subcommittee during hearings that U.S.
flag surge sealift was inadequate to meet all DOD requirements and the charter of
foreign flag breakbulk and roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ships was necessary [Ref. 49: pp.
1-31.
Additionally, U.S. flag operations were unable to rapidly provide the requisite number
of breakbulk ships needed for Desert Shield [Ref. 49: pp. 1-3].
Another interesting aspect of Operation Desert Shield has been the inability to
deploy Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships on schedule which were supposed to have
been deployable within a five day period. This inability was caused at least in part be-
cause of the poor material condition of these ships.
Seemingly, such deficiencies would translate into increased business for U.S.
commercial shipyards. However, DOD has been reluctant to spend money on improving
military sealift capability. Nearly $600 million dollars was appropriated in the FY 1990
budget for military sealift but S217.2 million of this sum was reprogrammed to help pay
for other defense account shortfalls. DOD refused to release the remaining $375 million
dollars for several months [Ref. 45: pp. 1-3 and Ref. 50: pp. 1-3].
A year earlier, Everett Pyatt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Shipbuilding and Logistics, labeled the Military Sealift Program as in "reasonably good
health" [Ref 5: p. 24]. His statement, which follows, summarized the Navy's position
on commercial shipbuilding.
While we sympathize with the currently depressed industry and we continue to
support the need for an adequate ship-yard industry, we cannot support industrial
capacity that is excess to our needs [Ref. 5: pp. 19-201.
DOD's reluctance to participate in improvement to military sealift capability
seems to be motivated by two factors:
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1. DOD has itself been forced into austerity measures which threaten the number of
weapon systems which can be purchased.
2. Congress endorses additional military sealift capability. Given the contrarian na-
turc of political decision making, Congressional support for additional military
sealift capability frees DOD to pursue acceptance of other weapons systems with
Congress. Apparently, DOD assumes that resourceful lawmakers will find a way
to fund military sealift enhancements regardless of the wishes of defense depart-
ment officials.
The political intrigue notwithstanding, one thing is clear: advocates of com-
mercial shipbuilding will continue to eye DOD's budget as a potential source of funds.
Indeed, by forfeiting one SSN-21 submarine with a price tag of $1.4 billion dollars, the
U.S. could purchase forty-six 60,000/65,000 DWT bulk and combined carriers at the
prevailing world price of S30 million [Ref. 48: p. 1 and Ref. 19: p. 51].
3. End Subsidies Abroad
One story currently unfolding in the policy arena, is the Shipbuilders Council
of America (SCA) filing of a Section 301 petition under the amended U.S. Trade Act of
1974. This petition asks the U.S. Trade Representative to negotiate an end to domestic
shipbuilding subsidies in various nations. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Carla
Hills, despite aggressive pursuit of the issue internationally, has been largely
unsuccessessful in getting the nations involved to sign an agreement which includes
sanctions against those nations that violate the proposed anti-subsidy agreement [Ref.
51: p. 2]. Additionally, bipartisan legislation has been introduced which would levy a
"special assessment on subsidized foreign ships entering U.S. ports" [Ref. 52: p. 2].
Influential members of Congress, including House Chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski (D-ll.), have told the USTR that the most recent
deadline in the process, 14 December 1990, must be met or the "U.S. government would
have to evaluate other options to ensure that the subsidies do not continue to harm the
U.S. shipbuilding industry" [Ref. 53: p. 3].
Such legislation poses some interesting policy questions. Is the U.S. really pre-
pared to engage in a trade war with countries that have traditionally been considered its
allies in order to protect its commercial shipbuilding interests? Is the trade petition issue
really a backdoor mechanism for re-subsidizing U.S. shipyards? Should the USTR fail
to make progress with the international shipbuilding community and Congress fail to
take action against nations subsidizing their shipbuilding programs, it would appear that
the SCA would have a compelling argument for obtaining a modern version of Con-
struction Differential Subsidies.
74
The attempt to end subsidies abroad comprises a cleverly crafted strategy. It
appeals to American's sense of fair play, yet may in itself be a veiled request for domestic
subsidies. However, this strategy has two primary problems:
I. It is unlikely that the USTR can get the international community to agree to end
subsidies [Ref. 54: p. 3].
2. If the playing field were indeed leveled, it is unlikely given other data presented in
this thesis that U.S. commercial shipbuilders would fare very well. Even SCA
president John Stocker concedes, "We are not ten feet tall" [Ref. 5: p. 491.
4. Pursue Environmental Issues
Another issue which offers a potential springboard of opportunity for U.S.
commercial shipbuilders is the environment. "Black ooze is becoming a more common
sight on our beaches than suntan lotion" [Ref. 55: p. 1].
The aftermath of the Exxon Valdez mishap, the Mega Borg fireioil spill and
other several well publicized incidents is that the American public has grown increasingly
less tolerant of tanker spills which threaten the environment. In response to public
pressure, during July 1990, "Congress agreed to require double hulls for new tankers and
to phase them in for most existing ships by 2010" [Ref. 56: p. A-141.
Such legislation offers the promise of more commercial business for American
shipyards. Some have suggested that U.S. yards have the capability to compete for
export orders on "radically different product-environmentally-sensitive, double hull
tankers" [Ref. 57: pp. 1-2]. While the recently passed double-hull legislation may have
the desirable impact of accelerating replacement of Jones Act tonnage, it is difficult to
believe that other nations will not maintain some productive edge in constructing d3uble
hull technology ships.
5. Shipyard Recovery Program
The SCA has its own detailed plan for reversing the decline of the shipbuilding
industry in this country. It is called the Shipyard Recovery Program, and it is an
amalgam of several alternatives listed previously. This proposal includes [Ref. 5: pp.
55-591:
1. Putting an end to foreign shipbuilding subsidies
2. Government support for commercial research and development
3. The construction of Military Sealift Tankers. Such construction is to serve as a
bridge between the current military orientation of U.S. yards to a more
commercially-based U.S. industry.
4. The design and construction of a fast Monohull Sealift Ship
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5. Funding for a fast sealift ship of the future.
The plan also encourages productivity enhancements including:
" Increased investment in new capital
" Greater cooperation between labor and management
" Increased worker training
" Employment of more productive shipbuilding technique.
While the plan has considerable merit, principal problem areas are:
1. The uncertainty entailed in getting foreign nations to end their shipbuilding subsidy
programs
2. DOD's reluctance to fund enhancements to military sealift capability
3. A lack of specifics on achievement of productivity improvement.
Even if such a plan were adopted, a demanding mechanism for monitoring its
execution would be essential to ensure that mistakes made during the CDS era were not
repeated.
6. Final Note
Yhe future of America's commercial shipbuilding industry is murky. The fore-
going section has detailed a number of alternatives for improvement. An effort has been
made to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each option. However, one thing
is certain. If no aggressive action is taken, commercial shipbuilding in this country faces
almost certain extinction. It would be a national tragedy for a once proud industry to
face such an ignoble demise. Dr. Paula J. Pettavino poignantly summarized the plight
of shipbuilding in this country,
The current American maritime structure is like a beautiful flower without a sub-
stantial root system. If we do not strengthen the roots, the flower is in danger of
perishing [Ref. 58: p. 55].
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APPENDIX A. INTERNATIONAL WAGES
All dollar and local currency wages and percentages with the exceptions contained
in the two notes below for 1989 were obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
publications [Ref. 9: pp. 1-3]. The methodology used for compiling this data is identical
to that used by BLS in [Ref. 9: pp. 1-3] and the data is identical to BLS data to three
decimal places. Data is subject to the remarks and limitations listed at the end of this
appendix. The second column lists hourly wages in U. S. dollars. The third column lists
hourly wages in units of local currency and is readily obtained by multiplying the data
in the second column by the applicable BLS currency conversion factor contained in
Appendix B. The fourth column is a percentage ratio of foreign wages in dollars to U.S.
wages in dollars (i.e., in 1981 Belgian dollar wages were 108.869 % of U.S. dollar wages).
A. EXCEPTIONS
I. Note One
In 1989, wages measured in U.S. dollars for Belgium and the Netherlands were
not available from BLS. Consequently, 1988 dollar wages were used as the basis for
1989 information about these two countries. 1989 conversion factors and U.S. wages
for 1989 were used to derive data in columns 3 and 4 for this year. (Dollar wages (Col-
umn 2) in Belgium and the Netherlands are the same during 1988 and 1989. The infor-
mation in columns three and four for 1989 in these two countries was "forced" using
actual 1989 local currency conversion factors and actual 1989 U.S. dollar wages.)
2. Note Two
Data was not available from BLS to measure Spanish wages in U.S. dollars for
1989. Since Southern European dollar wages in Italy and Great Britain rose modestiy
from 1988 to 1989, Spanish dollar wages were assumed to follow the same pattern. The
51 cent raise in Italy from 1988 to 1989 and the 17 cent raise in the United Kingdom
from 1988 to 1989 were averaged and a 34 cent raise was applied to 1988 Spanish dollar
wages to obtain 1989 Spanish dollar wages. The 1989 peseta to dollar conversion factor
and U.S. wages for 1989 were used togethcr with the reconstructed Spanish dollar wage
data to derive the numbers in columns 3 and 4 for this year. Spanish dollar wages are
34 cents higher in 1989 that they were in 1988. The information in columns 3 and 4 for
1989 was "forced" using an actual 1989 peseta-to-dollar currency conversion factor and
actual 1989 U.S. dollar wages.)
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BELGIUM
Year $ LC %/ U.S.
1981 13.38 495.461 108.869
1982 10.91 499.460 80.935
1983 10.35 529.092 74.946
1984 9.78 564.795 68.825
1985 10.17 603.488 69.801
1986 13.79 615.861 94.001
1987 16.75 625.780 117.215
1988 16.78 617.168 117.097
1989 16.78 610.959 113.609
DENMARK
Year S LC 0/0U.S.
1981 10.15 72.085 82.587
1982 9.56 79.769 70.920
1983 9.26 84.710 67.053
1984 8.46 87.561 59.536
1985 8.59 91.054 58.957
1986 11.70 94.711 79.755
1987 15.55 106.486 108.817
1988 16.99 114.530 118.562
1989 16.23 11I8.820 109.885
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FINLAND
Year $ LC % U.S.
1981 8.91 38.4734 72.498
1982 8.79 42.2711 65.208
1983 8.42 46.8489 60.970
1984 8.79 52.7488 61.858
1985 9.14 56.6406 62.732
1986 12.89 65.3781 87.866
1987 15.67 69-0107 109.657
1988 17.73 74.3419 123.726
1989 19.66 84.4593 133.108
FRANCE
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 8.92 48.2483 72.579
1982 8.95 58.8820 66.395
1983 8.97 68.3514 64.953
1984 8.86 77.4009 62.350
1985 8.93 80.1914 61.290
1986 11.66 80.7571 79.482
1987 13.97 83.9876 97.761
1988 14.51 86.4651 101.256
1989 14.09 89.8942 95 396
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WEST GERMANY
Year $ LC % U.S.
1981 11.67 26.3042 94.955
1982 11.60 28.1648 86.053
1983 11.65 29.7541 84.359
1984 10.68 30.3846 75.158
1985 11.01 32.3914 75.566
1986 15.19 32.9623 103.545
1987 19.39 34.8632 135.689
1988 20.89 36.7037 145.778
1989 20.16 37.9209 136.493
NETHERLANDS
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 10.22 25.4274 83.157
1982 10.02 26.7734 74.332
1983 9.57 27.3128 69.298
1984 8.63 27.6850 60.732
1985 8.87 29.4306 60.878
1986 12.68 31.0406 86.435
1987 15.60 31.6056 109.167
1988 15.87 31.3909 110.747
1989 15.87 33.6761 107.448
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NORWAY
Year $ LC % U.S.
1981 11.72 67.132 95.362
1982 11.59 74.837 85.979
1983 11.16 81.479 80.811
1984 10.87 88.699 76.495
1985 11.25 96.671 77.213
1986 14.13 104.534 96.319
1987 18.43 124.237 128.971
1988 19.88 129.697 138.730
1989 19.63 135.702 132.904
ITALY
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 8.47 9579.6 68.918
1982 8.23 11143.4 61.053
1983 8.48 12881.1 61.405
1984 7.98 14012.9 56.158
1985 8.35 15940.1 57.310
1986 11.23 16743.9 76.551
1987 13.83 17937.5 96.781
1988 14.59 18996.2 101.814
1989 15.10 20717.2 102.234
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SPAIN
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 7.03 646.76 57.2009
1982 6.69 736.57 49.6291
1983 5.69 816.51 41.2020
1984 5.35 860.28 37.6495
1985 5.54 941.80 38.0233
1986 7.74 1083.60 52.7607
1987 9.54 i178.19 66.7599
1988 10.85 1264.02 75.7153
1989 11.19 1324.90 75.7617
UNITED KINGDOM
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 7.30 3.13900 59.3979
1982 6.97 3.98754 51.7062
1983 6.47 4.26826 46.8501
1984 6.11 4.57150 42.9979
1985 6.37 4.91000 43.7200
1986 7.78 5.30051 53.0334
1987 8.92 5.43941 62.4212
1988 9.89 5.55225 69.0160
1989 10.06 6.14062 68.1110
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UNITED STATES
Year s LC % U.S.
1981 12.29 12.2900 100
1982 13.48 13.4800 100
1983 13.81 13.8100 100
1984 14.21 14.2100 100
1985 14.57 14.5700 100
1986 14.67 14.6700 100
1987 14.29 14.2900 100
1988 14.33 14.3300 100
1989 14.77 14.7700 100
JAPAN
Year S LC % U.S.
1981 7.79 1714.58 63.385
1982 6.98 1738.72 51.780
1983 7.70 1829.52 55.757
1984 7.80 1851.72 54.891
1985 8.12 1936.62 55.731
1986 11.37 1914.71 77.505
1987 12.57 1817.62 87.964
1988 14.83 1901.21 103.489
1989 14.67 2025.93 99.323
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KOREA
Year S LC 0/ U.S.
1981 2.06 1403 16.762
1982 2.13 1556 15.801
1983 2.21 1717 16.003
1984 2.19 1765 15.412
1985 2.30 1999 15.786
1986 2.49 2194 16.973
1987 2.99 2456 20.924
1988 4.40 3217 30.705
1989 6.35 4263 42.993
84
REMARKS AND LIMITATIONS
The accompanying tables present international comparisons of hourly compcnsation
costs, hourly direct pay, and pay for time worked for production workers in manu-
facturing in (various) countries or areas. The total compensation measures are
prepared by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to provide a better basis for as-
sessing international differences in employer labor costs. Comparisons bascd on the
more readily available average earnings statistics published by many countries can
be very misleading. National definitions of average earnings differ considerably;
average earnings do not include all items of labor compensation; and the omitted
items of compensation frequently represent a large proportion of total compen-
sation. The total direct pay and pay for time worked measures are prepared to
provide a comparable basis for analyzing the main components of total compen-
sation.
The compensation and other pay measures are computed in national currency units
and are converted into U.S. dollars at prevailing commercial market currency ex-
change rates. Hourly compensation converted into U.S. dollars at commercial
market exchange rates is an appropriate measure for comparing levels of employer
labor costs. It does not indicate relative living standards of workers or the pur-
chasing power of their income. Prices of goods and servicers vary greatly among
countries, and commercial market exchange rates are not reliable indicators of rela-
tive differences in prices.
DEFINITIONS
Hourly compensation is defined as (1) all payments made directly to the work, be-
fore payroll deductions of any kind, and (2) employer social insurance
expenditures--that is, expenditures for legally required insurance programs and con-
tractual and private benefit plans. In addition, for some countries, compensation is
adjusted for othL1 taxes on payrolls or employment (or reduced to reflect subsidies),
even if they are not for the direct benefit of workers, because such taxes are regarded
as labor costs. However, hourly compensation does not include all items of labor
costs. The costs of recruitment, employee training, and plant facilities and
services--such as cafeterias and medical clinics--are not covered because data are not
available for most countries. The labor costs not covered account for no more that
4 percent of total labor costs in any country for which data are available. For con-
sistency, compensation is measured on an hours-worked basis for every countr'.
Hourly direct pay includes pay for time worked (basic time and piece rates plus
overtime premiums, shift differentials, other premiums and bonuses paid regularly
each pay period, and cost-of-living adjustments) and other direct pay--pay for time
not worked (vacations, holidays, and other leave, except sick leave), seasonal or ir-
regular bonuses and other special payments, selected social allowances, and the cost
of payments in kind, before deductions of any kind. Direct pay is also measured on
an hours-worked basis for every country.
Pay for time worked includes only basic time and piece rates, overtime premiums,
shift differentials, other premiums and bonuses paid regularly each pay period, and
cost-of-living adjustments (COLA's). Pay for time worked is measured on an
hours-worked basis for every country.
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Production workers generally include those employees who are engaged in ftbricat-
ing, assembly, and related activities; material handling, warehousing, and shipping;
maintenance and repair; janitorial and guard services; auxiliary production (e.g.,
powerplants); and recordkeeping and other services closely related to the above ac-
tivities. Working supervisors, are generally included; apprentices and other trainees
are generally excluded.
METHODS
Total compensation is computed by adjusting each cnuntry's average earnings series
for items of direct pay not included in earnings and for employer expenditures for
legally required insurance, contractual and private benefit plans, and average
earnings for items of direct pay not included in earnings. Pay for time worked is
measured by adjusting average earnings, where necessary, to eliminate other items
of direct pay. For the United States and other countries that measure earnings on
an hours-paid basis, the figures are also adjusted in order to approximate compen-
sation or pay per hour worked.
Earnings statistics are obtained from surveys of employment, hours, and earnings
or from surveys or censuses of manufacturers.
Adjustment factors are obtained primarily from periodic labor cost surveys and in-
terpolated or projected to nonsurvey years on the basis of other available informa-
tion; or they are obtained from surveys of manufacturers or reports on social
security and fringe benefits s xstems. For some countries, data are not available to
compute pay for time worked.
The statistics are also adjusted, where necessary, to account for major differences in
worker coverage; differences in industrial classification systems; and changes over
time in survey coverage, sample benchmarks, or frequency of surveys. Special esti-
mation procedures have been used for some countries because of incomplete data.
Hourly compensation costs, hourly direct pay, and pay for time worked are con-
verted to U.S. dollars using the average daily exchange rate for the reference period.
Changes in hourly compensation in U.S. dollars from one period to another are
therefore affected by changes in currency exchange raLes as well as by changes in
compensation. The exchange rates used are prevailing commercial market exchange
rates as published by either the U.S. Federal Reserve Board or the International
Monetary Fund.
DATA LIMITATIONS
Because compensation and direct pay (and, for some countries, pay for time worked)
are partly estimated, the statistics should not be considered as precise measures of
comparative compensation costs. In addition, the figures are subject to revision as
the results of new labor cost surveys or other data used to estimate compensation
costs become available.
The comparative level figures in these tables are averages for all manufacturing in-
Justries and are not necessarily representative of all component industries. In the
United States and some other countries, such as Japan, differentials in hourly com-
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pensation costs levels by industry are quite wide. In contrast, other countries, such
as German- and Sweden, have narrow differentials.
LABOR COSTS VERSUS LABOR INCOME
The hourly compensation figures in U.S. dollars shown in the tables provide com-
parative measures of employer labor costs; they do not provide intercountry com-
parisons of the purchasing power of worker incomes. Prices of goods and services
vary greatly among countries, and the commercial market exchange rates used to
compare employer labor costs are not reliable indicators of relative differences in
prices. Purchasing-power-parity exchange rates--that is, the number of foreign cur-
rency units required to buy goods and services equivalent to what can be purchased
with one unit of U.S. or other base-country currency--must be used for meaningful
international comparisons of the relative purchasing power of worker incomes [Ref.
12: pp. 2-5].
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APPENDIX B. CURRENCY CONVERSION FACTORS
The data obtained in this appendix was extracted from Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) publications [Ref. 12: pp. 10-18]. Listed are the yearly average exchange rates
between units of foreigr currencies and the U.S. dollar during the period of this study.
The names of the relevant foreign currencies are listed below:
1. Northern Europe















* United States: dollar
YEAR BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE FRG NETHERLANDS
1981 37.0300 7.1020 4.31800 5.40900 2.25400 2.48800
1982 45.7800 8.3440 4.80900 6.57900 2.42900 2.67200
1983 51.1200 9.1480 5.56400 7.62000 2.55400 2.85400
1984 57.7500 10.3500 6.00100 8.73600 2.84500 3.20800
1985 59.3400 10.6000 6.19700 8.98000 2.94200 3.31800
1986 44.6600 8.0950 5.07200 6.92600 2.17000 2.44800
1987 37.3600 6.8480 4.40400 6.01200 1.79800 2.02600
1988 36.7800 6.7410 4.19300 5.95900 1.75700 1.97800
1989 36.4100 7.3210 4.29600 6.38000 1.88100 2.12200
YEAR NORWAY ITALY SPAIN UK USA JAPAN KOREA
1981 5.72800 1131 92.0 0.430000 1 220.1 681.0
1982 6.45700 1354 110.1 0.572100 1 249.1 731.1
1983 7.30100 1519 143.5 0.659700 1 237.6 775.8
1984 8.16000 1756 160.8 0.748200 1 237.4 806.0
1985 8.59300 1909 170.0 0.770800 1 238.5 870.0
1986 7.39800 1491 140.0 0.681300 1 168.4 881.4
1987 6.74100 1297 123.5 0.609800 1 144.6 822.6
1988 6.52400 1302 116.5 0.561400 1 128.2 731.5













APPENDIX C. STEEL PRICES
International steel prices for the years 1981-1989 for heavy plate steel were obtained
from yearly ediions of the Metal Bulletin Handbook [Ref. 10: pp. 157-241] and its suc-
cessor, Metal Bulletin's Prices and Data Book [Ref. 11: pp. 183-240]. The unit used was
the metric ton. Prices listed in this appendix for each country are comprised of two en
tries per year. The first price listed is the price in U.S. dollars per metric ton rounded
to the nearest dollar. The second caption lists the prices per ton in units of local cur-
rency. This figure was obtained by applying the appropriate currency conversion factor
shown in Appendix B to the dollar figure in the first column.
Since U.S. prices were listed in hundreds of lbs. of steel, a conversion factor of
20.3208 was used to convert the price per 100 lbs. into the price per metric ton. Chapter
II contains additional remarks regarding the methodology used to obtain steel prices.
Following the listing of the data used in this thesis, the special procedures used to re-
construct steel prices for Norway and Spain are discussed.
YEAR BELGIUM DENMARK
$ LC $ LC
1981 331 12256.9 299 2123.50
1982 344 15748.3 340 2836.96
1983 332 16971.8 322 2945.66
1984 296 17094.0 296 3063.60
1985 288 17089.9 295 3127.00
1986 396 17685.4 386 3124.67
1987 482 18007.5 456 3122.69
1988 489 17985.4 464 3127.82




1981 335 1446.53 327 1768.74
1982 347 1668.72 356 2342.12
1983 306 1702.58 335 2552.70
1984 284 1704.28 302 2638.27
1985 275 1704.17 294 2640.12
1986 382 1937.50 395 2735.77
1987 439 1933.36 462 2777.54
1988 452 1895.24 480 2860.32
1989 450 1933.20 454 2896.52
YEAR GERMANY(FRG) NETHERLANDS
LC $ LC
1981 357 804.678 309 768.79
1982 371 900.788 364 972.61
1983 366 934.764 347 990.34
1984 328 933.160 308 988.06
1985 318 935.566 292 968.86
1986 431 935.270 408 998.78
1987 528 949.344 499 1010.97
1988 541 950.537 511 1010.76




1981 292 1672.58 346 391326
1982 291 1878.99 368 498272
1983 290 2117.29 357 542283
1984 314 2562.24 312 547872
1985 302 2595.09 264 503976
1986 365 2700.27 405 603855
1987 402 2709.88 484 627748
1988 457 2981.47 482 627564
1989 466 3221.46 477 654444
YEAR SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM
LC $ LC
1981 357 32844.0 423 181.890
1982 357 39305.7 358 204.812
1983 334 47929.0 315 207.805
1984 302 48561.6 296 221.467
1985 290 49300.0 312 240.490
1986 449 62860.0 375 255.487
1987 474 58539.0 424 258.555
1988 495 57667.5 463 259.928
1989 483 57187.2 446 272.238
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YEAR UNITED STATES JAPAN
$ LC LC
1981 464 464 370 81436.9
1982 493 493 313 77968.2
1983 517 517 314 74606.4
1984 498 498 316 75018.4
1985 498 498 302 72027.0
1986 395 395 357 60118.8
1987 387 387 422 61021.2
1988 462 462 517 66279.4
1989 478 478 496 68497.6
A. NORWEGIAN S;TEEL PRICE COMPUTATION (1981-1989)
Norwegian steel prices for 1981-1989 were obtained by, first, converting Swedish
steel prices in Swedish krona to U.S. dollars using the appropriate yearly krona to dollar
conversion ratio contained in Appendix B and extracted from [ Ref. 12: pp. 10-181. After
conversion, a two percent transportation charge was added to the Swedish price to ob-
tain an approximation of the Norwegian price. Norwegian prices were rounded to the
nearest U.S. dollar. This methodology is shown in Table 29 on page 95.
B. SPANISH STEEL PRICE COMPUTATION (1981-1985)
A simple arithmetic average in dollars of four European countries, two Northern
European, Belgium and France, and two Southern European: Italy and the United
Kingdom were used to compute Spanish steel prices from 1981 through 1989. The re-
sults are shown in Table 30 on page 95.
Spanish steel prices for the period 1986-1989 were obtained fiom the Metal Bulletin
Price [Ref. 10: pp. 157-241] and Data Book [Ref. 11: pp. 183-2401 and are listed above
in the same format as provided for other countries in Appendix C.
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Table 29. NORWEGIAN STEEL PRICE COMPUTATION: 1981-1989
Swedish Swedish Steel Price Transportation NorwegianYear Steel Pnce Krona to in $ Charge Steel Price
1981 1440 5.035 285.99 .02 292
1982 1790 6.284 284.85 .02 291
1983 2180 7.672 284.15 .02 290
1984 2550 8.271 308.31 .02 314
1985 2550 8.603 296.41 .02 302
1986 2550 7.127 357.79 .02 365
1987 2550 6.347 393.89 .02 402
1988 2750 6.137 448.10 .02 457
1989 2950 6.456 456.94 .02 466
Table 30. SPANISH STEEL PRICE COMPUTATION: 1981-1985
Year BELGIUM FRANCE ITALY U.K. SPAIN
1981 330.78 326.92 346.23 423.26 357
1982 344.-.0 356.44 367.62 358.32 357
1983 331.90 335.46 357.03 315.80 334
1984 296.10 301.91 311.69 296.17 302
1985 288.16 293.71 263.52 312.92 290
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APPENDIX D. NEWBUILDING PRICES.
The Minitab (a statistical software package) output contained in this appendix de-
tails the methodology used to obtain the newbuilding prices used in Figure 1 and Col-
umn I of Table 14. Prices were obtained from [Ref. 19: p. 61]. Data on deadweight
tonnage was taken from [Ref. 20: pp. 684-6871,
Prices were divided into two categories. One category consisted of four weight
classes of tankers. The second category consisted of four different classes of bulk and
combined carriers.
Ships were also considered to belong to one of two different types of tonnage.
Tankers comprised one type; bulk and combined carTiers comprised the other.
The arithmetic weight that a given price category contributed to total composite
ship price changed from year to year. 'he change in this weight was based on th. ratio
of the amount of deadweight tonnage ordered for that ship type to the overall world
tonnage ordered for that year.
The data reflects the change in ship buyer preference from bulk and combined car-
riage tonnage during the period 1981 to 1986 to tanker tonnage during the 1987-1989
timeframe.
MTB > redd 'newbuild data' cl-c14
9 ROWS READ
ROW YEAR 30-35 tk >80 tk >135 tk >280tk 40 b&c 60-65b&c 140 b&c
1 81 30 35 43 70 19 26 40
2 82 19 25 30 50 16 19 2q
3 83 18 23 29 47 15 18 27
4 84 15 21 27 40 14 16 22
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ROW 100 obo tot tons tot tk blktons con tons dry tons
i 48 59 19.3 33.5 2.0 3.6
2 32 5? 15.0 32.0 4.1 4.1
3 30 49 11.5 27.0 3.1 4.2
4 26 56 11.9 34.0 3.9 3.9
MTB > print ci-zi
ROW YEAR 30-35 tk >80 tk >135 tk >280tk 40 L&c 60-65b&c
1 81 30 35 43 70 19 26
2 82 19 25 30 50 16 19
3 83 18 23 29 47 15 18
4 84 15 21 27 40 14 16
5 85 13 19 25 37 11 14
6 86 15 23 30 45 12 17
7 87 17 30 34 48 18 20
8 88 24 34 45 73 21 26
89 28 43 52 82 25 30
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MTB > print c8-c14
ROW 140 b&c 100 obo tot tons tot tk blktons con tons dry tons
1 40 48 59 19.3 33.5 2.0 3.6
2 29 32 57 15.0 32.0 4.1 4.1
3 27 30 4q 11.5 27.0 3.1 4.2
4 22 26 56 11.9 34.0 3.9 3.9
5 21 22 52 14.0 29.0 3.7 2.9
6 23 28 43 12.9 23.0 3.2 2.5
7 30 33 33 14.9 12.0 2.0 2.0
8 38 45 35 19.3 10.5 3.0 1.7
9 44 54 37 20.0 12.0 2.9 2.1
MTB > let c15 = (c2+c3+c4+c5)/4
MTB > name cl5 = 'avgtkprc'
MTB > let c16 = (c6+c7+c8+c9)/4
MTE > name c16 = 'avgbcprc'
MTB > let c17 = (cll*c15)/clO
MTB > name c17 = 'tk wght'
MTB > let c18 = c12+c13+c14
MTB > name c18 = 'tl bk tn'
MTB > let c19 = (c16*c18)/clO
MTB > name c19 = 'bk wght'
MTB > let c20 = c17+c19
MTB > name c20 = 'ship prc'
MTB > print cl cl5-c20
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ROW YEAR avgtkprc avgbcprc tk wght tl bk tn bk wght ship prc
1 81 44.5000 33.2500 14.5568 39.1 22.0352 36.5919
2 82 31.0000 24.0000 8.1579 40.2 16.9263 25.0842
3 83 29.2500 22.5000 6.8648 34.3 15.7500 22.6148
4 84 25.7500 19.5000 5.4719 41.8 14.5553 20.0272
5 85 23.5000 17.0000 6.3269 35.6 11.6385 17.9654
6 86 28.2500 20.0000 8.4750 28.7 13.3488 21.8238
7 87 32.2500 25.2500 14.5614 16.0 12.2424 26.8038
8 88 44.0000 32.5000 24.2628 15.2 14.1143 38.3771
9 89 51.2500 38.2500 27.7027 17.0 17.5743 45.2770
KEY TO COLUMN NAME ABBREVIATIONS
* Cl = Year
* C2 = 30-35tk: 30,000-35,000 DWT tanker price in millions(S)
* C3 = > 80tk: 80,000 DWT tanker price in millions(S)
* C4 = > 135tk: 135,000 DWT tanker price in millions(S)
* C5 = > 280tk: 280,000 DWT tanker price in millions(S)
* C6 = 40b&c: 40,000 DWT bulk & combined carrier price in millions(S)
* C7 = 60-65b&c: 60,000-65,000 DWT bulk & combined carrier price in millions(S)
* C8 = 140 b&c: 140,000 DWT bulk & combined carrier price in millions(S)
* C9 = 100 OBO: 100,000 DWT bulk & combined carrier price in millions(S)
* CIO = Tot tons: Total world tonnage on order (in millions of DWT)
* CII = Tot tk: Total tanker tonnage on order (in millions of DWT)
* C12 = Blk tons: Total bulk tonnage on order (in millions of DWT)
* C13 = Con tons: Total container tonnage on order (in millions of DWT)
* C14 = Dry tons: Total dry tonnage on order (in millions of DWT)
* CI5 = Avtkprc: Average tanker price in millions(S)
* C16 = Avbcprc: Average bulk & combined ship price in millions(S)
* C17 = tk wght: Contribution of tanker price to newbuilding price in millions(S)
* C18 = tl bk tn: Total bulk, container and dry tonnage on order (in millions of
DWT)
: C19 = Bk wght: Contribution of bulk, container and dry price to newbuilding
price in millions(S)
C20 = Ship Price: Composite newbuilding price in millions(S)
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APPENDIX E. PRODUCTION TOTALS
This appendix contains commercial ship production totals by country measured in
gross tons for the years 1981 through 1989. Data was obtained from [Ref. 3: p.31, [Ref.
23: pp. 76-77, Ref 24: pp. 28-60, Ref 25: pp. 1-2, and Ref 26: pp. 1-2]. Since data
contained in [Ref. 24: pp. 28-601 for the years 1984-1986 was measured in DWT instead
of GT, the table contained in [Rof. 1: p. 388] was used to convert deadweight tonnage
to approximate gross tonnage.
YEAR BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE
1981 155251 352220 216507 501519
1982 147797 451367 270610 264810
1983 299809 443861 259621 307609
1984 178138 467774 404280 342644
1985 124506 446880 403759 151207
1986 99176 306647 4071- 131320
1987 14336 243218 167919 167027
1988 54767 376856 166874 71823
1989 39438 342960 193970 159565
YEAR FRG NETHERLANDS NORWAY ITALY
1981 702253 172964 310164 271489
1982 615407 212186 347463 176785
1983 798461 231758 182036 255888
1984 627538 134265 93081 147839
1985 850505 72707 78704 63315
1986 818650 193363 88315 33242
1987 341319 59300 62264 312989
1988 521156 59232 52589 144887
1989 430845 88814 32710 327202
100
YEAR SPAIN UK USA JAPAN
1981 779619 212696 360136 8399831
1982 557012 434599 215746 8162915
1983 500706 496835 380899 6670317
1984 510825 306984 146702 8972974
1985 387276 177327 117679 8763957
1986 335573 92781 132659 7498721
1987 324541 194231 164326 5707898
1988 161584 59975 10765 4040199












APPENDIX F. PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES
This appendix is divided into two parts. Part one contains labor productivity as
measured in manhours per ship by country. Equations 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, in Chapter III,
were used to formulate this data. Summary totals for Northern Europe, Southern
Europe, and European overall are also shown.
Part two of this appendix contains material productivity as measured in metric tons
of steel per ship. Equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, in Chapter III, were used to formulate this
data. Summary totals for Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and European overall are
also shown.
PART ONE
YEAR Bel Hrs Den Hrs Fin Hrs Fra hrs
1981 637557 840444 957409 956335
1982 742411 847250 921468 904995
1983 940190 1050860 1155697 1084835
1984 1174778 1358077 1307091 1296765
1985 1352548 1601329 1504969 1540360
1986 1084682 1278442 1160416 1282827
1987 968758 1043518 1035527 1161539
1988 1226446 1211288 1160732 1418316
1989 1279325 1322679 1091917 1523569
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YEAR Ger Hrs Net Hrs Nor Hrs NE Hrs
1981 730978 834688 727859 812181
1982 698251 808354 698853 803083
1983 835276 1016820 871951 993661
1984 1075780 1331325 1056976 1228684
1985 1249357 1550780 1222704 1431721
1986 984712 1179635 1058582 1147042
1987 836859 1040173 880451 995260
1988 985150 1296772 1035200 1190557
1989 1064836 1352683 1093586 1246942
YEAR It Hrs Span Hrs UK Hrs SE Hrs
1981 1007144 1213444 1168563 1129717
1982 984169 1210118 1162081 1118989
1983 1147520 1710188 1504014 1453907
1984 1439766 2147540 1880415 1822573
1985 1647355 2482927 2159406 2096562
1986 1331947 1932528 1922592 1729022
1987 1173297 1700912 1819137 1564448
1988 1410539 1896753 2080867 1796053
1989 1421661 1918417 2133905 1824661
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YEAR EU Hrs US Hrs Jpn Hrs
1981 907442 1350967 756265
1982 897855 1012206 846300
1983 1131734 1084231 973963
1984 1406850 1170578 1178194
19L5 1631173 1322601 1415975
1936 1321635 1144731 973527
1987 1166016 1100286 859034
1988 1372205 1243404 830774
1989 1420257 1160887 777980
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PART TWO
YEAR Bel Tons Den Tons Fin Tons Fra Tons
1981 77997.6 86345.1 77066.2 78951.6
1982 53250.9 53877.4 52790.5 51456.0
1983 51602.4 53204.9 55986.9 51140.2
1984 54529.1 54529.1 56833.1 53445.7
1985 54062.9 52780.1 56618.6 52959.6
1986 43287.0 44408.5 44873.5 43396.6
1987 39114.1 41344.2 42945.3 40807.3
1988 49609.8 52282.8 53670.8 50540.0
1989 52063.5 59812.5 57154.1 56650.6
YEAR Ger Tons Net Tons Nor tons NE Tons
1981 72317.1 83550.7 88415.1 80663.3
1982 49375.5 50325.1 62949.6 53432.1
1983 46808.7 49371.7 59075.8 52455.8
1984 49209.2 52404.6 51403.2 53193.4
1985 48962.6 53322.3 51556.7 52894.7
1986 39771.8 42013.9 46963.5 43530.6
1987 35706.4 37781.5 46897.9 40656.6
1988 44841.4 47474.0 53083.6 50214.6
1989 50929.4 54032.3 55191.8 55119.1
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YEAR It Tons Spa Tons UK Tons SE Tons
1981 74616.1 72317.1 61033.6 69322.2
1982 49778.0 51311.8 51168.5 50752.7
1983 47988.7 51293.4 54387.2 51223.1
1984 51732.7 53445.7 54529.1 53235.8
1985 58977.7 53690.1 49904.2 54190.6
1986 42325.1 38177.4 45711.1 42071.2
1987 38952.4 39774.2 44464.6 41063.7
1988 50330.3 49008.5 52395.7 50578.1
1989 53919.0 53249.2 57666.7 54944.9
YEAR EU Tons US Tons Jpn Tons
1981 77260.9 74345.6 62305.3
1982 52628.3 56012.0 52374.2
1983 52086.0 56711.2 49254.5
1984 53206.1 63752.5 46014.6
1985 53283.4 71838.1 46616.5
1986 43092.8 76975.5 42742.7
1987 40778.8 71274.4 40105.7
1988 50323.6 66021.6 43048.7
1989 55066.9 59784.9 49044.8
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